Comparisons between explicit,implicit perceptual,and implicit conceptual memory tests : A selective review by Cabeza Roberto & Ohta Nobuo
Comparisons between explicit,implicit
perceptual,and implicit conceptual memory
tests : A selective review
著者 Cabeza Roberto, Ohta Nobuo
雑誌名 筑波大学心理学研究
号 15
ページ 71-100
発行年 1993-03-12
URL http://hdl.handle.net/2241/13362
Tsuki4ba Psychological Research 
1993 , 1 5 , 71-100 
71 
Comparisons between explicit, implicit perceptual, and 
implicit conceptual memory tests: A selective review 
Roberto Cabeza and Nobuo Ohta 
(h4stitute of Psychology. U14iversity of Tsuhuba. Tsukuba 305. Japan) 
Abstract 
The standard data concerning comparisons between explicit, implicit perceptual, and implicit 
conceptual tests can be summarized in five conclusions: (1) conceptual manipulations affect expli-
cit, and implicit conceptual, but not implicit perceptual tests; (2) perceptual manipulations, con-
versely, affect implicit perceptual, but not implicit conceptual and explicit tests; (3) generate is 
better for explicit and implicit conceptual tests, but read is better for implicit perceptual tests; (4) 
explicit and implicit condeptual tests can be dissociated; and (5) there is not priming on implicit 
perceptual tests without perceptual match. Two theoretical approaches can account for these stan-
dard results: the data-driven/conceptually-driven view, and the PRS view. Recently, counterexam-
ples have been found for each of the five conclusions emanated from the standard data. These in-
consistent findings are stimulating new empirical and theoretical developments in the field of 
priming research. 
Key words: priming, explicit tests, implicit perceptual tests, implicit conceptual tests 
Many of the most important discoveries in the 
field of memory were originated on the comparison 
between different memory measures. Comparisons 
between recall, cued recall and recognition tests, for 
example, fueled fundamental theoretical develop-
ments in the 70s. During the last decade, the task-
comparison methodology has ' became still more 
prominent due to the inclusion, among the tests 
being compared, of a new kind of tests called impli-
cit memory tests. (Graf & Schacter, 1985). These 
tests measure a particular kind of memory effects 
called primirrg, which behaves quite differently than 
the forms of memory studied in the past. Trying to 
understand and explain priming phenomena, memory 
researchers have conducted a myriad of experi-
ments, and proposed numerous competing theories. 
In recent years, this field has become even more 
complex due to distinction between two types of im-
plicit tests, implicit perceptual tests and implicit 
conceptual tests. This review is concerned with the 
empirical and theoretical aspects of the comparison 
between explic t, implicit perceptual, and implicit 
conceptual tests. This review is limited in two ways. 
First, it does not c mprise the whole field of priming 
research, but only those studies pertinent to the dis-
tinction between perceptual and conceptual forms of 
implicit tests. Second, it focus on articles published 
in recent years, in particular on those published af-
ter 1988, and henc  not included on the two exhaus-
tive reviews of the field of priming, Schacter (1987), 
and Richardson-Klavehn & Bjork (1988). 
Basio Concepts 
Ex licit memory tests, such as recall and recogni-
tion tests, request subjects to retrieve studied items 
in rder to complete the test; implicit memory tests, on 
t e other hand, do nof mention the study episode, 
but require subjects only to focus on the task at 
hand, which, however, reveals retention of the study 
episode in the form of priming. In a very abstract 
sense, primil4g can be defined as a facilitation on the 
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processing of a stimulus caused by a previous pro-
cessing episode, without any requirement that the 
rememberer be aware of the first processing episode. 
When the two processing episodes involve the same 
target item, even if the perceptual form is different 
(e.g.,diwosaur. D N SA ), the facilitation is 
known as direct primil4g ; when they involve diffe-
rent items (e.g., doctor. 14urse) it is called iludirect 
primil4g. A special case of direct priming is repetition 
priming, which involves the same item in the same 
perceptual form (e.g., dil40saur, di,40saur) (Roediger, 
1990a). Both direct and indirect priming has been 
studied under two different experimental paradignis, 
called here the prime-target parddigm and the study-
test paradigm. While the second paradigm belongs 
mainly to the field of memory, the first is also very 
common in other domains, such as the domain of 
lexical access in the field of psycholinguistics. This 
review is concerned with research done using the 
second paradigm, but in order to clarify some termi-
nology it is convenient to make a brief description of 
both methods. 
Two paradigms of priming research 
The prime-target paradigm has two basic char-
acteristics. First, it usually does not involve separate 
_study and test phases; and second, the processing 
episode that generates the facilitation, and the one 
that receives it =are separated only by a brief time 
interval. In the basic paradigm, subjects are pre-
sented with a list of words and have to make a re-
sponse for some or all of them. Usually the response 
is to decide whether a string of letters is a word 
(lexical decision task), or to read to read a word aloud 
lpronunciation task). The critical responses are those 
made for some items called targets. A target is pre-
ceded, with or without intervening items, by another 
item called prime. Priming refers to the effects of the 
processing of the primes on the responses to the 
targets. Priming is usually a facilitation - e.g., an in-
crease of the accutacy or speed of the responses, but 
sometimes it can be an inhibition. 
Most research on the prime-target paradigm has 
focused on indirect priming. When primes and 
targets are different - e.g., different words, priming 
occur only when they have some kind of relation. 
They can have, for example, a pre-experimental con-
ceptual or perceptual relation. It has been shown, for 
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example, that the lexical decision for a word (e.g. 
liurse) is speed up w n it is preceded by a semanti-
cally related prime (e.g., doctor). This form of priming 
is know  as semal4tic primil4g (for a review see Nee-
ly, 1991). Priming is also found when the prime and 
the target have a perceptual relation, such as when 
they have similar orthography (e.g. Meyer, 
Schvaneve dt, an  Ruddy, 1974; Hillinger, 1980). 
Additio ally, a relation between a prime and a 
t rget can be experimental, for example, when an 
association betw en two items is established by pair-
ing them repeatedly during a preliminary phase of 
the experiment. This kind of priming is called episo-
dic pri,ning ( .g., McKoon & Ratcliff, 1979, 1986; 
D sher & Rosedal , 1989). Finally, the prime-target 
paradigm has been also used to investigate repetition 
primil4g (e.g.. K nwisher, 1987). 
Unlike the prime-target paradigm, the study-test 
paradigm involves a study phase, an interval phase, 
and a test phas . Dur ng the study phase subjects are 
presented with a series of stimuli. The stimuli can 
be verbal (e.g. words, word-pairs, sentences) or non-
verbal (e.g. pictures or drawings of objects, patterns 
of lines, faces). Learning can be intentional, but 
usually it is incidental, and subjects are required to 
p rform some kind of study task on the items in the 
tudy list. Study tasks usually emphasize the proces-
sing of some aspects (e.g. structural, semantic) of the 
stimu i more than others. After a retel4tion il4terval 
phase, which can vary from a few seconds to more 
than  year, the test phase starts, includirig one or 
more tests. In the implicit tests, subjects are asked 
to respond to a list of cues, but explicit retrieval is 
not required. Some of the cues correspond to studied 
items, the targ ts, and some to nonstudied items. 
Priming is said to have occurred when the perform-
ance on the cues f the targets is better than per-
formanc on the cues of nonstudied. items, or base-
line.
Implicit perceptual and implicit conceptual tests 
According to their cues, implicit tests can be di-
vided in two groups: implicit perceptual tests and 
implicit conceptual tests. The cues of the implicit per-
ceptual test  have a perceptual relation with the 
targets; they are usually copies of the targets in 
which perceptu information has been reduced by 
the deletion of some parts, or by a brief presentation 
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time. The most common implicit perceptual tests are 
word completion, and perceptual identification tests. 
Completion tests require subjects to complete mis-
sing letters on the cues, which can be three-letter 
;word-stem completiole test - WSC), stems (e.g., DI 
or a combination of letter and blanks (e.g., D N 
SA ;wordJragment completion test - WFC). There 
are also nonverbal completions tests, Iike the picture 
fragment conopletion test (e.g., Snodgrass, 1989; Wel-
don & Roediger, 1987). In the perceptual identifica-
tion test, subjects try to identify briefly presented 
stimuli (e.g. 35 milliseconds). The stimuli of the per-
ceptual identification test can be words (word idel4ti-
ficatiole test - WI) or pictures lpicture 14aming test). 
In the implicit conceptual tests, in contrast, the 
cue-target relation is not perceptual, but conceptual. 
On the geleeral knowledge test (GKT), subjects have to 
answer quiz-like questions, such a~ What is the name 
of the gigantic reptile that became extil4ct durilcg pre-
history?. The cues of the category association test 
(CAT) are category names, and subjects have to 
generate one or several exemplars for each of them 
(e.g., reptiles: snake, crocodile, dil40saur...). On the free-
association test, subjects have generate one or several 
associates in response to the cues (e.g. mammoth:). 
Sometimes, subjects may study a related word pair 
like table-chair, and receive a free-association test 
with cues like table-. In this cases, the cue-target 
relation of the free-association test involves not only 
a pre-experimental semantic association between 
table and chair, but also an experimental association 
between these words. Despite the superimposed epi-
sodic association, the pre-experimental conceptual 
association is very strong, and it would be reason-
able to classify this kind of test as an implicit con-
ceptual tests. Other times, subjects may study a un-
related word pair like table-chair, and receive a free-
association test with cues like table-.. In these 
cases, the cue-target relation is fundamentally ex-
perimental, and the free -association test cannot be 
classified as an implicit conceptual test. It could be 
classified in a third group called implicit episodic 
tests. 
Another classification problem exist for the 
hybrid implicit test used in the paradigm known as 
implicit memory for 14ew associati014s (e.g., Graf & 
Schacter, 1985; Schacter & Graf, 1986a, 1989; 
Schacter & McGlynn, 1989). In this paradigm, sub-
jects study words accompanied by unrelated cantext 
wor s (e.g. m ther-CALENDAR), and then receive a 
word-stem completion test, in which the stems are 
accompanied by the same (e.g. mother-CAL ), or 
different context words (e.g. officer-CAL ). Typi-
cally, mor  priming is obtained when the original 
con ext word is instated at test, than when a new 
con ext word is used. The cues of the cowtext-stem 
completion test, involve two elements. One is the pre-
experimental perceptual relation between the stem 
and the target (e.g., CAL -CALENDAR). The 
second is the relation between the context word and 
th ta get (e.g., mother-calendar). The interpretation 
of he nature of this second component depends on 
the explana ion of the context effect. The typical ex-
plan tion of the superiority of the same-context con-
dition is typically interpreted as evidence that a 
newly established association can affect priming. 
Accord ng this explanation, the second component is 
pisodic, and hence the context-stem completion test 
could be characterized as a hybrid perceptual/episo-
dic test. 
However, according a 14on-associative explal4ation 
of con xt effects (e.g., Lewandowsky, Kirsner, & 
Bainbridge, 1989) targets words have several mean-
ings, and context words at study bias interpretation 
towards one of them. For example, when subjects 
read mother-calendar they might think on Mother's 
Day and encode calendar as a chart of weeks and 
months, whereas wh n they read food-caleudar they 
might think on crops, and encode calendar a measure 
of the du ati n of the year and the seasons. Accord-
ing this view, the superiority of the same-context 
conditi n (e.g. mother CAL ) is an the effect of 
the reinstatement of the encoded sense of the words. 
This view explains context effect without assuming 
the establishment of new associations. Since the rela-
tion between the context and target (e.g., between 
mother and calel4dar) is not episodic but a preexper-
imental conceptual relation, then the context-stem 
comp e ion test could be classified as a hybrid per-
ceptual/con eptual test. 
From now on, this review will focus on three 
kinds of tests: explicit tests, and two types of impli-
cit tests: implicit perceptual tests and implicit con-
ceptual tests  Fo  convenience, implicit perceptual 
tests are called perceptual tests, and implicit concep-
tual tests are called conceptual tests. In should be 're-
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membered, then, that the expressions "perceptual 
tests" and "conceptual tests" refer always to implicit 
tests. 
Standard Data 
In this section we review empirical evidence 
that support some original assumptions concerning 
priming on perceptual and conceptual tests. Com-
parisons between different memory tests are usually 
summarized in terms of two possible outcomes: dis-
sociations or parallel effects. There are two forms of 
dissociations: functional or contingent. Fu;1ectional 
dissociations occur when an independent or subject 
variable produce different patterns of results on 
different memory tests. Contil4gent dissociati014s does 
not involve an independent variable and are based 
on comparing performance on two successive tests 
for the same set of target items. If performance on 
the items of one test does not predict performance 
on the same items on the other test, a contingent dis-
sociation occur, and the two tests are said to be 
stochastically independent. Parallel effects occur 
when an independent variable produce similar 
effects on the two tests. 
The results are organized in four sections; the 
first three sections are concerned with dissociations 
between explicit and perceptual tests; and between 
perceptual~ and conceptual tests; the fourth is con-
cerned with dissociations between explicit and con-
ceptual tests. The first section reviews the effects of 
conceptual manipulations, the second the effects of 
perceptual manipulations, and the third, the effects 
of a procedure that involves both kinds of manipula-
tions. The term conceptual mal4ipulations refer here to 
procedures that affect in particular the processing of 
conceptual aspects of the information, such as diffe-
rent levels of elaboration during encoding. Perceptual 
mal4ipulations, on the other hand, refer to procedures 
that affect specially the processing of perceptual fea-
tures of the information, such as presenting stimuli 
on different modalities. The following review of the 
standard data focus on those conceptual and ~ercep-
tual manipulations that have been investigated 
already on the relatively new and unexplored con-
ceptual tests. The effects of the manipulations on ex-
plicit and perceptual tests are summarized briefly, 
and the corresponding studies are not referenced, 
because they have been exhaustively reviewed by 
Schacter (1987) and Richardson-Klavehn and Bjork 
(1 988). 
Conceptual manipulations affect explicit tests 
and conceptual tests, but not perceptual tests 
In general, co ptual manipulations tend to 
affect explicit, and conceptual tests, but not percep-
tual tests. Three conceptual manipulations are consi-
de ed here: I vels-of-processing, imagery, and list 
organization. The typical levels-ofLprocessil4g (LOP) 
procedu involves two encoding conditions: a 
semo etic task mphasizing the meaning of the stimuli, 
a  a physical task underscoring their perceptual 
properties. In general, the LOP manipulation pro-
duces a cle r dis ociation between explicit and per-
ceptua  tests: whereas on explicit tests, the semantic 
task yield  better performance than the physical 
ta k, on p ceptual tests, both tasks generate a simi-
lar amount of priming. The data concerning the 
effects of LOP o  conceptual tests is scarce, but it 
suggest that conceptual tests are sensitive to the 
LOP manipulation. Hamann (1990, Expts.1 & 2) in-
vestigated LOP effects on two conceptual tests, the 
general knowledge tests (GKT) and the category 
ass ciation test (CAT). In both tests, priming on the 
semantic task (lik ng rating) yielded more priming 
than the physical task (colnpare vowels between suc-
cessiv study list words). Likewise, Srinivas & 
Ro diger (1990) fou d more priming on a different 
kind of CAT in the semantic (pleasantness rating) 
than in the physi al condition (count consonants). 
LOP effects hav  been also found on implicit 
episodic and hybrid tests used in the paradigm of 
mplicit memory for new associations. Schacter and 
colleagu s f und that for an unrelated word pair to 
generate priming on the free-association test (e.g., 
Schacter & McGlynn, 1989), or the context-stem test 
(e.g., Graf & Schacter, 1985; Schacter & Graf, 
1986a), it is necess ry that the two words are en-
coded toge her by a semantic orienting task (e.g., 
generate a sentence linking the words). Priming does 
n t occ r when the study task is not semantic, even 
if it i vol es processing together both words (e.g., 
compare the number of vowels on the two words). 
The second conceptual manipulation to be consi-
d red is image y instructions at study. Blaxton 
(1989, Exp. 3) investigated the effect of this man-
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ipulation on explicit, perceptual and conceptual 
tests. She found a significant effect of imagery (imag-
ery condition > no-imagery condition) on the explicit 
semantic cued recall and free recall test, but not on 
the perceptual WFC. Like the explicit tests, and un-
like the WFC, the conceptual GKT was enhanced by 
the imagery instruction. A puzzling result of this ex-
periment was that an explicit test with perceptual 
cues, the graphemic cued recall, was not affected by 
the imagery manipulation. This finding will be dis-
cussed later. 
Finally, the third manipulation to be considered 
is list organization. Organization refers to the pro-
cess of grouping items on the basis of their common 
characteristics. Organization is guided by previous 
knowledge and implies conceptual processing of the 
information. The organization process is enhanced 
when the items in a list that can be grouped (e.g.., 
animals, furniture) are presented together, rather 
than in random order. Rappold & Hashtroudi (1991) 
investigated the effect of a blocked/random organi-
zational manipulation on explicit, perceptual and 
conceptual tests. Explicit p~rformance on the free-
recall and category cued-recall tests was better in 
the blocked condition than in the random condition 
(Expts. 1, 2, and 4), but priming on a word identi-
fication test (WI) was not affected by the manipula-
tion (Exp. 5). Like explicit performance and unlike 
priming in the WI, priming on the category associa-
tion test was larger in the blocked than in the ran-
dom condition (Exp. l, 2, 3, and 5). In sum, concep-
tual manipulations, such as LOP, read/generate, im-
agery, and list organization, tend to affect explicit 
and conceptual tests, but not perceptual tests. 
Perceptual manipulations affect perceptual tests, 
but not conceptual tests and explicit tests 
Perceptual manipulations usually involve a com-
parison between one condition in which the format 
of the information at study and at test is different 
(e.g. auditory presentation at study and visual pre-
sentation at test) with a condition in which study 
and test format is the same (e.g. visual presentation 
study and test). In general, study-test shifts on 
typography (e.g., handwritten vs. typewritten); mod-
ality (e.g., auditory vs. visual), symbol type (e.g., 
word vs picture), and language (e.g. English vs. 
Spanish) produce a marked reduction on priming, 
bu  lmost no eff c  on explicit tests (for review see 
Kirsner & Dunn, 1985, and Roediger & Blaxton, 
1987a). These findings support the idea that, unlike 
explici  memory, primi g on perceptual tests is very 
sensit ve to percept al aspects of the stimuli. Blax-
ton (1989, Exp. 2) and Srinivas & Roediger (1990, 
Exp. 2) had their subjects study words in the audi-
ory and visual modalities, and tested them in the 
visual modality, on different memory tests. Priming 
was markedly reduced in the auditory condition, but 
the modality manipulation neither affected the expli-
cit tests, n r th  conceptual GKT. Surprisingly, per-
formance on the x licit graphemic cued recall was 
better in the visual than in the auditory condition. 
This result will be discussed later. Srinivas & 
Roediger (1990) replicated the marked effects of the 
modality shifts o  the word fragment completion, 
and found no effects of modality on a different con-
ceptual tes , the c egory association test. 
The effects of typography shifts are less evident 
than those of m dality shifts. In general there is 
agreement that typography changes affect perceptual 
tests, but lit le or nothing explicit tests. Roediger & 
B axton (1987a, Exp. 1), for example, found signifi-
cant effects of a uppercase/lowercase manipulation 
on a word fragment completion, but not on a recogni-
tion test. The effects of typography on conceptual 
t sts were investigat d by Blaxton (1990, Exp. 3). 
Subje ts studied words in a lowercase italic type, 
and in a uppercase elite type, and the cues of the 
tests (i.e., the fragments in the WFC, and questions 
in th  GKT) appeared also in these two typefaces. 
The manipulation did not affect neither the explicit 
tests, nor the general knowledge test. These results 
suggest that, Iike explicit tests and unlike perceptual 
tests, conceptual tests are not sensitive to typogra-
phy shif s. 
Generate is better for explicit tests and concep-
tual tests, but read is better for perceptual tests 
The two previous s ctions reviewed results in-
dicati g that conceptual manipulations affect explicit 
and conceptual ests, but not perceptual tests, 
whereas perceptual ma ipulations affect perceptual 
tests, but not conceptual and explicit tests. What 
happens when an xperimental procedure involves 
both kinds of manipulations? Jacoby (1983) had sub-
jects read target tems (e.g., cold ) in a wo-context con-
dition (xxx-cold), read them in a context condition 
(hot-cold), or provide them in a generate condition (hot-
P??). In a recognition test the generate condition 
yielded better results than the no -context condition, 
with the context condition falling in between. In con-
trast, priming on a word-identification test (WI) 
showed the converse pattern of results: no-context > 
context > generate. The superiority of the generate 
condition over the read condition on the recognition 
test is a well known phenomenon called generation 
effect (Slamecka and Graf, 1978). Jacoby's (1983) 
original firiding was the reversal of the generation 
effect, or 14egative generation effect (Gardiner, 1988), 
on the word-identification test. 
Most experimental dissociations between two 
tests occur when a manipulation affects one of them, 
but not the other. The dissociation found by Jacoby 
(1983) is more impressive: the read/generate proce-
dure affected both tests, but in different directions. 
However, such cross-over dissociation is not sur-
prising if we think that this .procedure, as pointed 
out by Hamann (1990), confounds two variables. 
One variable is whether the item is generated or not, 
the other is whether it is on not seen. The first vari-
able affect conceptual processing, the second, percep-
tual processing. Thus, it is reasonable to interpret 
the cross-over dissociation found by Jacoby (1983) 
as the effect of two manipulations: a conceptual man-
ipulation that affected recognition but not WI, and a 
perceptual manipulation that affected WI but not 
recognition. In this sense, the effects of the read/ 
generate procedure on explicit and perceptual tests 
is perfectly consistent with the results of the concep-
tual and perceptual manipulations described before. 
The effect of the read/generate manipulation on 
conceptual test~ was first studied by Blaxton (1989, 
Exp. 1). Her results showed a dissoc.iation between a 
perceptual test and an conceptual test. In the concep-
tual GKT, as well as in the explicit free recall and 
semantic cued recall tests, performance was better in 
the generate than in either the context or the no-
context condition (generation effect). In the percep-
tual WFC, in contrast, performance was better in the 
no-context condition, than in the generate and con-
text conditions (negative generation effect). A puz-
zling finding in this experiment was that the explicit 
graphemic cued recall test showed the same pattern 
as the perceptual WFC. This finding will be discus-
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sed later. Srinivas & Roediger (1990, Exp. l) found 
a similar dissociation between WFC, and the concep-
ual CAT. In sum, he read/generate procedure com-
bines the effects of conceptual and perceptual man-
pulations. As i the case of conceptual manipula-
tions, the condi ion involving more conceptual pro-
cessing, the ge era e condition, yields better per-
f mance on explicit and conceptual tests, but not on 
implicit perceptual tests. As in the case of percep-
tual m nipulations, the condition involving more per-
ceptual pr cessing, the read condition, enhances per-
formance on perceptual tests, but not conceptual or 
xplicit tests. 
The last three sections can be summarized in a 
simple sta em t: whereas conceptual manipulations 
tend to affect explicit and conceptual tests, but not 
perceptual tests, perceptual manipulations tend to 
aff ct perc ptual tests, but not conceptual or explicit 
tests. Thus, these two kinds of manipulations typi-
cally originate dissociations between explicit and 
perceptual tests, and between perceptual and concep-
t al tests, but produce parallel effects between expli-
cit and conceptual tests. The fact that in most ex-
perim nts conceptual tests behave similarly to expli-
cit test  might sugg st that the so-called conceptual 
tests are not au hentic implicit tests, but explicit 
tests in disguise. Even the instructions of conceptual 
tests do not mention the study episode, some pecu-
liarity of these tests, such as the conceptual nature 
of th ir cues, might induce subjects to voluntarily 
retrieve tudied it ms, in order to complete the cues. 
In such case, putative conceptual tests would be in 
fact a kind of xplicit tests, and the pattern of dis-
sociations would be perfectly clear. However, con-
ceptual tests n t ly can be dissociated from per-
ceptual tests, but also from explicit tests. This dis-
sociation evidence is reviewed in the next section. 
Expl cit tests and conceptual tests can be dis-
sociated 
The constitution of the domain of priming re-
sear h, is in a great part a consequence of the dis-
covery that, despite being severely impaired per-
formance on xplicit tests, amnesic patients show 
normal levels of priming on perceptual tests (for a 
review see Shimamura, 1986). The domain of pre-
served priming in amnesics is not limited to percep-
tual tests; considerable priming on amnesics has also 
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been found on conceptual tests, such as CAT (e.g., 
Gardner, Boller, Moreines, & Butters, 1973; Graf, 
Shimamura, and Squire, 1985). These findings sup-
port the idea that performance on both perceptual 
and conceptual forms of implicit tests is preserved 
in amnesics. Additionally, when unitized materials, 
such as highly related word pairs (e.g., table-chair; 
Shimamura & Squire, 1984) or two-word common 
idioms (e.g., sour grapes; Schacter, 1985), are em-
ployed, amnesics also show priming on implicit epi-
sodic tests, Iike the free-association test. With 
nonunitized materials, Iike unrelated word pairs, 
amnesic still show priming on the hybrid context-
stem completion test (Graf & Schacter, 1985), 
although this ability seems to be limited to mild 
amnesics (Schacter & Graf, 1986b). However, Tulv-
ing, Hayman and Macdonald (1991) found that even 
a densely amnesic patient can manifest implicit mem-
ory for new associations. 
As for evidence from normal subjects, there are 
at least two studies showing dissociations between 
explicit and conceptual tests. The first is the 
aforementioned study of Rappold and Hashtroudi 
(1991), in which blocked lists yielded better per-
formance than random lists on explicit and concep-
tual tests, but not perceptual tests. Despite this pa-
rallel effect between explicit and conceptual tests, 
these authors found that the effect of list organiza-
tion persisted much longer on the explicit--about 24 
hr, than on conceptual tests--less than 45 min (Exp. 
4). Moreover, when the frequency of category inst-
ances was manipulated (Exp. 3), results were diffe-
rent on these two types of tests: high-frequency inst-
ances were better recalled than low-frequency inst-
ances, but both produced a similar amount of prim-
ing on the conceptual category association test. 
The second study is the one by Cabeza and 
Ohta (in press). In their second experiment, one 
group of subjects received a recognition test fol-
lowed by an implicit category association test, while 
the other group received a recoguition test followed 
by an explicit category association test (i.e., a cued 
recall test with categories as cues). The explicit 
category association test had the same nominal cues 
of the standard implicit category association test 
(e.g., reptiles:), but the instructions were explicit, that 
is, subjects were not instructed to freely generate 
category instances, but to use category names as 
cues to recall th  studied words. The results indi-
cated that recognition was stochastically indepen-
dent of the implicit category association test, but de-
pende t f the explicit version of this test. These re-
sults indicate, first, that conceptual tests are, in fact, 
different from xplicit tests, and second, that, at 
least in some conditions, they are not contaminated 
by explicit strategies. Since the only difference be-
tween the two conditions was the retrieval orienta-
tio  of the second test, a contamination by. explicit 
trategies can be safely discarded. If such complica-
tion had occu red, a similar result should have been 
found in oth ditions. To summarize this section, 
disso i tion evidence from both amnesic and normal 
subjects suppor  the idea that conceptual tests are 
genuine implicit tests, rather than explicit tests in 
disguise. 
There is not different form priming on percep-
tual tes  
As was described before, perceptual manipula-
tions involving a change on the physical appearance 
of the items between study and test produce a strong 
effect on perceptual tests. Priming in the condition 
in which he physi al appearance of study and test 
item  matches (same form primil4g. Kirsner, Dunn, & 
Standen, 1989) is usually larger than priming in the 
condition n which it mismatches (differel~tform prim-
ing). Moreover, several of the earliest studies on 
priming found that different form priming not only 
is smaller than same form priming, but that it is 
nonsignificant. They found, for example, that words 
presented a ditorily did not produce significant 
priming on visual perceptual identification (e.g., 
Jacoby and Dallas (1981; Morton, 1979) or lexical 
decis on tes s (e.g., Monsel, 1985). Conversely, there 
wer reports that auditory study produce only little 
or o priming o  auditory perceptual identification 
(e.g., Ellis, 1982) and lexical decision tests (e.g., 
Kirsner & Smith 1974). 
The foregoing results showing that priming on 
perceptual tests disappear when modality is changed 
betwe n study and test suggest that priming in these 
tests is extremely dependent on the reinstatement of 
the perceptu l charac eristics of the stimuli. This 
conclusion is supported also by studies showing that 
g nerating a word from a picture (e.g., Morton, 
1979) or from a d finition (e.g., Winnick & Daniel, 
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1970)' does not produce significant priming on per-
ceptual identification. In sum, several of the earliest 
studies on priming found that priming on perceptual 
tests occur only when there is a perceptual overlap 
between study and test items. 
Standard Theorles 
Theoretical accounts of priming can be classi-
fied according how they explain the underlying 
mechanism of priming, or according how they ex-
plain dissociations and parallel effects between diffe-
rent memory tests. According the first criterion, 
theoretical accounts of priming can be classified in 
two groups: activation accounts, and episodic 
accounts. Activation accowats assume that priming is 
caused by a modification on a preexistent abstract 
memory representation. When an item is presented, 
its corresponding representation is activated, and 
this increased activation facilitates subsequent pro-
cessing of the same item. The activation process has 
been conceptualized as a lowering on the firing 
threshold of a lexical unit or logogen (e.g., Morton, 
1979), or as an increase on the integration of the in-
ternal organization of an schema (Graf & Mandler, 
1984). A Iowering of threshold can produce a re-
cord of the presentation of an item, but not of its 
perceptual attributes or its context. The modality of 
presentation of the stimuli can be registered by a 
system containing separate visual and auditory 
logogens (Morton, 1979). Unlike threshold lowering, 
the integration process is assumed to vary according 
the characteristics of the processing of the item, and 
hence it can leave a record of its perceptual attri-
butes. 
According episodic accoul4ts (e.g., Jacoby, 1983; 
Jacoby & Brooks, 1984; Roediger & Blaxton, 
1987a), priming is not caused by a modification on a 
preexistent representation, but by the establishment 
of a new episodic representation. When an item is 
presented, a record of the episode is created, and 
priming reflects the retrieval of such episodi-c re-
cord. There are different opinions concerning what 
is encoded in this record. Jacoby and colleagues 
emphasize the role of pattern analyses, and propose 
that 'priming is particularly sensitive to the repeti-
tion of perceptual operations, although context plays 
also a role (e.g., Allen & Jacoby, 1990; Jacoby, 
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1983; Jacoby, Baker & Brooks, 1989). Masson and 
Freedman (1990), on the other hand, consider that 
in skilled reading perceptual analyses are not critic-
al, and that priming is based on a context-dependent 
interpretation of a target item. Priming, then, is de-
termined by the reinstatement of the original concep-
tual context. Finally, procedural interpretations 
propose that processing an item involves a training 
of mental operations, a process similar to the ac-
quisition of a motor skill (Kolers & Roediger, 1984). 
Priming occurs when the specific mental operations 
trained, are performed again. 
According how they explain dissociations and 
parallel effects, priming theories can be divided in 
two big groups, transfer-appropriate processing 
views, and multiple memory systems views. Tron4sfer-
cr propria  proce sing views are based on the tron4sfer 
ppropriate ocessileg pril~ciple, which states that 
memory performance is a function of the overlap be-
tween the cogni ive operations employed during 
study, and th s  tapped by the test. When the de-
gree of verlap between study and test operations in 
tw  memory tests is different, there is a dissociation; 
when it is similar, there is a parallel effect. Two 
transfe  -appropriate processing views have been 
proposed, one based in the distinction between data-
dr v n and conceptually-driven processing, and the 
th r based in the distinction between integrative 
and elaborative processing. The second view is not 
usually use to acc unt for the distinction between 
implicit perceptual and implicit conceptual tests, and 
hence, it will not be discussed in this review. 
Multiple memory systems views assume that dis-
sociations between two memory tests occur when 
they tap different memory systems, whereas parallel 
effects o cur when they tap the same memory sys-
tem. Two kinds of multiple systems views have been 
propose . One distinguishes between a declarative 
and a procedural memory system (e.g., Squire, 
1987). Like the integration/elaboration view, this 
v ew is not ordinarily employed to explain the dis-
tinction between perceptual and conceptual tests, 
and is not considered in the present review. The 
other multiple memory systems view distinguishes 
four memory systems, including a priming system 
called PRS (Tulving and Schacter, 1990). In short, 
the present review will consider two views concern-
ing dissociations and parallel effects between tests: 
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the data-driven/conceptually-driven view, the in-
tegration/elaboration view, and the PRS view. These 
views are briefly described below. 
Data-driven/conceptually-driven view 
The ctata-driven/conceptually-drivele view (e.g., 
Roediger & Blaxton, 1987a; Roediger, Weldon, & 
Challis, 1989), also called transfer-appropriate proc-
edures approach, is based on the idea that some 
study and test conditions emphasize data-driven pro-
cessing, whereas other study and test conditions 
underscore conceptually-driven processing. Data-
driven; processing refers to mental operations guided 
by physical properties of the input, whereas concep-
tually-driven processieeg refers mental processes 
guided by previous knowledge and expectations. On 
the basis of this distinction, and the transfer 
appropriate processing principle, the data-
driven/conceptually-driven view predicts that mem-
ory performance should be better when study and 
test emphasize the same kind of processing, data-
driven or conceptually-driven, than when they 
underscore different types of processing. The data-
driven/conceptually-driven view seems to adhere to 
an episodic account of the mechanisms of priming. 
Memory tests that emphasize perceptual proces-
sing are called data-driven tests, whereas tests that 
underscore conceptual processing are called concep-
tually-driven tests. The operational definition of 
these tests is based on the readlgenerate procedure: 
data-drivel4 tests are those tests in which the no-
context condition is better than the generate condi-
tion (generation effect), c014ceptually-drivele tests are 
those in which the reverse is true (negative genera-
tion effect). Studies that have investigated this man-
ipulation (e,g., Jacoby, 1983; Blaxton, 1989; Srinivas 
& Roediger; 1990) indicate that perceptual tests, 
such as perceptual identification and word fragment 
completion, are data-driven, whereas conceptual 
tests, Iike the general knowledge test and category 
association test, are conceptually-driven. Most expli-
cit tests in use (e.g., free recall, cued recall, and rec-
ognition) are conceptually-driven, but a few, Iike the 
graphemic cued recall test (Blaxton, 1989), are data-
driven. 
Roediger & Blaxton (1987a) pointed out that 
the distinction between data-driven and conceptually 
driven tests is not a dichotomy, and suggested that 
memory tests can be arranged along a continuum re-
flecting diff rent amounts of perceptual or concep-
tual processing. Among data-driven tests, for exam-
ple, it has been suggested that some tests, Iike the 
perceptual identification test are "more data-driven" 
than other tests, such as WFC. Recently, two con-
tinua - one r flecting perceptual processing, and 
one eflecting conceptual processing - has been 
proposed instead of one (Roediger & Challis, 1992). 
In this second conceptualization, data-driven and 
concep ually-driven processing are two separate 
dimension , and hence, do not necessarily trade off 
again~t ach a other. For example, a memory test--or 
a study task--can b  high on both types of proces-
sing. 
The main prediction of the data-driven/ concep-
tually-driven view, then, is that data-driven tests, 
such as perceptual tests, will benefit more from 
study conditions that emphasize data-driven proces-
sing, whereas conceptually-driven tests, such as con-
ceptual and most explicit tests, will benefit more 
from s udy conditions that emphasize data-driven 
proces ing. This prediction is consistent with most 
of th  standar  data summarized before. It can ex-
plairl why conceptual manipulations tend to affect 
expli it tests and conceptual tests, but not percep-
tual tests, wh reas perceptual manipulations produce 
the opposite ffect. Since the operational definitions 
of dat -driven test and conceptually-driven tests are 
based on the read-generate manipulation, the pattern 
of results produced by this manipulation are, by de-
fi i ion, with the consistent data-
driven/conceptually-driven view. This view can also 
account for e idenc  of null different format priming 
on p rceptual ests. ~ince these tests depend on the 
reinstatement of perceptual operations, study-test 
perceptual shifts.can eliminate priming. Finally, the 
data-driven/conceptually-driven view can explain 
why the graphemic cued recall is sensitive to per-
ceptual manipulations, Iike modality shifts (Blaxton, 
1989, Exp. 2), but not to conceptual manipulations, 
such as imagery (Exp. 3). Despite being explicit, this 
test is data-driven, and hence, it behaves similarly to 
perceptual tests. Thus, the critical distinction for 
this view is not between explicit and implicit tests, 
but between data-driven and conceptually-driven 
tests. 
However, ther  are wo pieces of evidence that 
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the data-driven/conceptually-driven view does not 
readily accommodate. First, it cannot easily explain 
evidence that, despite a severe impairment on expli-
cit memory performance, amnesic patients show pre-
served priming on implicit tests. Since explicit per-
formance is impaired, one possible explanation is 
that amnesic syndrome impairs conceptually-driven 
processing. However, preserved priming is also 
found on conceptual tests that are usually classified 
as conceptually-driven tests, such as the category 
association test (see Roediger, Weldon, & Challis, 
1989). In other words, amnesic memory performance 
does not depend on whether the test is data-driven 
or conceptually-driven, but on Whether it is explicit 
or implicit. Second, this view cannot easily account 
for dissociations between explicit tests, Iike recogni-
tion and cued recall, and conceptual tests, such as 
the category association test (Rappold and Hash-
troudi, 1991; Cabeza and Ohta, in press). Since both 
types of tests are conceptually-driven, this view 
does not predict, in principle, dissociations between 
them. 
PRS view 
The PRS view (Schacter, 1990; Tulving & 
Schacter, 1990) assumes that explicit tests, percep-
tual tests, and conceptual tests reflects three diffe-
rent forms of memory: explicit memory, perceptual 
primilcg, and conceptual priming respectively. Like in 
the data-driven/conceptually-driven view, memory 
tests are not assumed to be factor-pure; implicit-
perceptual tests, for example, may also show some 
sensitivity to conceptual priming. The PRS view 
proposes that explicit memory is based on an episo-
dic memory system, perceptual priming on a percep-
tual representation system (PRS), and conceptual prim-
ing on a semalctic memory system. Episodic memory 
stores information about personally experienced and 
temporally dated episodes; PRS is a brain system 
concerned with the identification of words and ob-
jects; and ~emantic memory is involved on the ac-
quisition and use of factual knQwledge. The model 
also includes a procedural memory system, which is 
responsible of skill performance. 
Dissociations and parallel effects between expli-
cit, perceptual, and conceptual tests occur because 
the functioning of episodic memory, semantic mem-
ory and PRS depends on different factors. Semantic 
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factors, for example, play an important role on the 
operation of episodic and semantic memory, but not 
on PRS, which is a pre-semantic system. In contrast, 
the hysical c aract ristics of the information are 
fundamental to PRS, but not to episodic and seman-
tic memory. On the ba is of these assumptions, the 
PRS vi w c n easily explain most of the dissocia-
tions and parallel effects of the standard data. Con-
ceptual manipu ations affect explicit test and concep-
tual tests, but not perceptual tests, because they in-
fluence the oper tions of episodic and semantic sys-
tems, but not those of PRS. Perceptual manipula-
tions, on the othe  hand, affect perceptual tests, but 
not concep ual test and explicit tests, because they 
alter the functioning of PRS, but not the operations 
of episodic and semantic memory. The effects of the 
r ad/generate manipulation can be explained as a 
combination of a perceptual and a conceptual man-
ipulation . Finally, reports of nonsignificant diffe-
rent form priming on perceptual tests are consistent 
with the assumption that these tests are based on 
PRS, which is a pre-semantic perceptual system, and 
hence, highly sensitive to perceptual study-test over-
lap. It is important to notice that these explanations 
are not circular, because the hypothetical properties 
of the three memo y systems are supported not only 
by priming data, but also by various kinds of 
neuropsychological evidence (see Tulving & Schac-
ter, 1990). 
Unlike the data-driven/conceptually-driven 
approach, the PRS view can easily explain why 
amnesic patients sh w poor performance on explicit 
tests, but normal priming on perceptual and concep-
tual tests. According the PRS view, the brain lesions 
that cause the amnesic syndrome impair the opera-
tions of episodic me ory, but not those of PRS and 
emantic memory (Tulving & Schacter, 1990). Since 
semantic m mory is lso assumed to underlie the ac-
quisition and use of factual information, this 
assumption implies that it should be possible to find 
ev dence of learning of new factual information in 
am esics. This vidence exist and has been reviewed 
by Tulving et al. (1991). The PRS view can also 
account for the dissociations between explicit and 
conceptual tests (Rappold & Hashtroudi, 1991; 
Cabeza & Ohta, in press). These two kinds of tests 
are assum d to be based on different systems, and 
hence re in principle dissociable. The weakness of 
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the PRS view is its difficulty to account for dissocia-
tions between conceptually-driven and data-driven 
explicit tests (Blaxton, 1989). Since all explicit test 
are assumed to depend on the episodic system no 
dissociations are predicted in princ'iple between 
them. 
In sum, both standard theoretical views can ex-
plain why conceptual manipulations affect explicit 
test, and conceptual tests, but not perceptual tests; 
why perceptual manipulations affect perceptual 
tests, but not conceptual test and explicit tests; why 
generate is better for explicit test and conceptual 
tests, but read is better for perceptual tests; and 
why there is not different form priming on percep-
tual tests. The data-driven/conceptually-driven view 
has difficulties explaining preserved priming in 
amnesics, and dissociations between conceptually-
driven explicit tests and conceptual tests. The PRS 
view can account for this evidence, but it cannot 
readily accommodate dissociations between concep-
tually-driven and data-driven explicit tests. Despite 
these small limitations, both theories provide an ex-
celent account for most of the standard data. Unfor,-
tunately, priming data is not so simple as it was de-
scribed in the section of standard data. In recent 
years, many studies have found results in dissagree-
ment with the standard data. The next section re-
views some of these inconsistent findings. 
Inconsistent Data 
For the sake of simmetry, the results in this 
section are divided in five groups. Each group con-
tains findings that represent exceptions or anomalies 
of the five general conclusions that summarized the 
standard data. For example, the first statement of 
the standard data was that conceptual manipulations 
affect explicit tests and conceptual tests, but not per-
ceptual test, whereas the first part of this s~ction re-
views reports showing that conceptual manipulations 
can affect perceptual tests. 
Conceptual manipulations can also affect per-
ceptual tests 
One of the most conspicuous inconsistencies 
with the standard data are reports of LOP effects on 
perceptual tests. As it was said before, there is a 
widely held idea that this kind of tests are insensi-
ive to conceptual manipulations such as LOP. 
How ver, Ch llis & Brodbeck (1992) presented evi-
dence showing that this idea is actually incorrect. 
Th y reviewed sixteen experiments that examined 
LOP effects on perc ptual tests, and found that in 
most experiments priming in the semantic condition 
was great r th in the physical condition, and that 
in many o  them this difference was also significant 
(e.g.. Squire, Shimamura & Graf, 1987; Srinivas & 
Roedig r, 1990; Bowers & Schacter, 1990; Graf, 
Squire & Mandler, 1984). Challis and Brodbeck 
themselves investigated the LOP manipulation on the 
word fragment completion test, and found significant 
LOP effects i th e  different experiments. Accord-
ing the autho s, reports of LOP effects on perceptual 
test  were disregarded for three reasons. First, in 
some cases, the effects were relatively small, and the 
sta istical power of the experiments was not enough 
to detect them. Seco d, the absence of LOP effects on 
perceptual t sts was consistent with original reports 
(e.g., Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Graf & Mandler, 1984) 
and w th dominant th oretical accounts. Third, signi-
ficant LOP effects were attributed sometimes to a 
c nta ination of the perceptual test by explicit re-
trieval strategies (e.g., Bowers & Schacter, 1990; 
Squire, et al., 1987). , 
An interesting additional finding of Challis and 
Brodbeck (1992) is that significant LOP effects on 
WFC appear in conditions in which subjects p~rform 
the same kind of task with all items in a list (seman-
tic and physical tasks are varied between-subjects, 
or within-subj~cts n blocked lists), but not when the 
task changes randomly for each item (within-subjects 
with m xed lists). Significant LOP effects were due 
to a decrease in physical condition (Expts. 1, 2 and 
3), or to an incr ase in the semantic condition (Exp. 
4). Ch lis and Brodbeck discussed these results in 
relation with thre  possible explanations of LOP 
effects in perceptual tests. The first explanation is 
that LOP effects reflect the use of explicit retrieval 
strategies. Since semantically encoded items are bet-
ter recalled than physically encoded items (e.g., 
Craik & Tulving, 1975; Graf & Mandler, 1984), if 
subjects try to recall study items during the implicit 
test, the semantic condition will surpass the physical 
condition. This expla ation was used to account for 
s gnificant LOP effects on perceptual tests (e.g., Bow-
ers & Schact r, 1990; Squire et al., 1987), but it 
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cannot accommodate the results of Challis and Brod-
beck (1992) first three experiments, where LOP 
effects in the unmixed list condition were due to a 
decrease on the physical condition, rather than to an 
increase in the semantic condition. The results of the 
fourth experiment, on the other hand, are compatible 
with this explanation. 
The second explanation is that the LOP man-
ipulation affects not only conceptual, but also per-
ceptual processing of the stimuli. It is possible, for 
example, that the shallow task of the physical condi-
tion does not allow the minimum of perceptual pro-
cessing necessary for lexical access, which seems to 
be a necessary condition for priming (Weldon, 
1991). This effect could be more severe when sub-
jects perform the physical task with all the items in 
the list, than when the task vary in an unpredictable 
fashion. Accc)rding this interpretation. LOP should 
appear in the unmixed list condition due to a de-
crease in the physical condition. This interpretation 
is consistent with the results of the first three ex-
periments. Conversely, it is possible that the seman-
tic condition enhance not only conceptual, but also 
perceptual processing (see Mandler. Hamson, & 
Dorfman, 1990) geherating in this way more prim-
ing on perceptual tests. This interpretation is consis-
tent with the results of the fourth experiment. Final-
ly, the third explanation is that perceptual tests are 
not factor=pure measures sensitive only to percep-
tual processes, but that they are also sensitive to 
conceptual processing. This hypothesis can account 
for significant effects of conceptual manipulations, 
such as LOP, on perceptual tests. It can also account 
foir several reports~to be reviewed later-that prim-
ing on perceptual tests can occur even in the abs-
ence of perceptual match between study and test 
items. 
Challis and Brodbeck pointed out that if any of 
the three explanation is valid. LOP effects on per-
ceptual tests would be consistent with contemporary 
theories of implicit and explicit memory. If LOP 
effects are caused by a fortuitous contamination by 
explicit strategies, by a perceptual component~ on the 
LOP manipulation, or by a conceptual component on 
perceptual tests, they would be compatible with the 
idea that perceptual tests are basically immune to 
conceptual manipulations. The third explanation, 
however, imply a risk for theoretical accounts of 
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priming. Neither of two theoretical accounts de-
sc b d assume that memory tests are factor-pure 
measures, an  hence they can account for LOP 
effects on percep ual tests by claiming that these 
tests not only involv data-driven, or PRS proces-
sing, but also conceptually-driven, or semantic pro-
cessing. However, if the mixture of processes in-
volved by a particular test cannot be estimated, and 
precise predicti ns cannot be made, then there is a 
r sk hat some assumptions of the two views become 
impossible to falsify, because inconsistent data can 
be explained in term of a mixture of components in 
the test.
In su , Challis a d Brodbeck showed that the 
widely held idea that perceptual tests are immune to 
conceptual manipulations is actually wrong. The 
reaso to summarize at length their article is that 
sev r l points of their discussion are relevant in 
general to all he group of findings inconsistent with 
the standard data, and standard theoretical 
approaches. First, Challis and Brodbeck suggested 
that LOP effects on perceptual tests were overlooked 
be aus  hey were not consistent with original re-
ports and the ai  theoretical accounts. The same 
phenomenon ight have occurred for many of the in-
consis ent data de cribed in this section. Second, 
Challis and Brodbeck found that the outcome of a 
experim nta manipulation may depend on apparent-
ly minor me hodological factors, such as whether 
study ist  are mixed or unmixed. This second point 
too is pertinent t  o her inconsistent data. Third, 
they suggested different ways in which an inconsis-
ent finding can be explained without abandoning 
standard theore ical accounts. An account in terms 
of a contam a ion by explicit strategies can be ap-
pli d to any inconsistent finding in which an implicit 
test behaves as an explicit test, when it is not sup-
posed o do so. The proposal that a conceptual man-
ipulation is also ceptual, or that a perceptual 
ma ipulati  is also conceptual, can be used to 
account many other inconsistent findings. Finally, 
the notion that memory tests are not factor-pure but 
invo ve a mix ure of components can explain many 
inconsistent outcomes. 
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Perceptual manipulations sometimes do not 
affect perceptual tests and affect conceptual and 
explicit tests 
According the standard data, perceptual man-
ipulations affect perceptual tests, but not conceptual 
tests and explicit tests. However, there are reports 
showing counterexamples to each of these three con-
clusions. Sometimes, perceptual manipulations do not 
affect perceptual tests, but affect conceptual tests 
and explicit tests. These three group of counterex-
amples are discussed in order. One perceptual man-
ipulation that usually does not affect priming on per-
ceptual tests is the change of surface features of the 
information (e.g., case, script, typefont, typography, 
voice) between study and test. In most of the studies 
that have manipulated surface features different 
form priming was as large as same form priming 
(e.g., Carr, Brown, & Charalambous, 1989; Clarke & 
Morton, 1983; Levy & Kirsner, 1989; Scarborough, 
Cortese, & Scarborough, 1977). 
It would be possible to argue that among per-
ceptual manipulations, study-test shifts on surface 
form are the ones that involve the slightest form of 
study-test perceptual mismatch. Nevertheless, even 
surface manipulations preserve modality and the 
basic structural components of the items (e.g., the 
letters of a word), the change in perceptual appear-
ance they involve is not insignificant. For example, 
when the case of a word is changed (e.g., dinosaur, 
DlNOSAUR) the appearance of most letters (e.g., d-D; 
n-N; a-A) changes considerably. Thus, findings show-
ing that surface manipulations does not affect prim-
ing on perceptual tests is inconsistent with the idea 
that priming in these tests is extremely dependent 
on the reinstatement of perceptual features of the in-
formation. 
Second, evidence that perceptual manipulations 
can affect conceptual tests has been found by Cabeza 
(1992) on the conceptual sentence completion test. 
This test is similar to the general knowledge test, 
but its cues are not questions (What is the 14ame of 
the gigantic reptile that became extil4ct durileg prehis-
tory?), but sentences with blanks (The cave mal4 fled 
terrified whele he saw the shadow of ale enormous 
.). Cabeza (1982) changed the script in which 
Japanese targets were presented at study and com-
pleted at test. In Japanese, most words can be writ-
ten both in an ideographic script called kanji, and in 
a phonographic scrip called hiragal4a. The same 
seman i  inform tio  seems to be accessed when a 
word is read in kanji or in hiragana, and hence, the 
m ni ulation of script seems to be fundamentally 
perce ptual. 
If the study-test shift on script is a perceptual 
manipulation it should affect perceptual tests, such 
as completion tests, but not conceptual tests, such as 
the sentence compl tion test. Confirming the first 
predicti n and in agreement with the transfer-
appropriat  processing principle, Cabeza (1992) 
found that words resented in hiragana produced 
mo e priming on a hiragana completion test than 
words presen ed in kanji, and that the opposite was 
true in a kanji completion test. Surprisingly, the 
script manipulation affected also the sentence com-
pletion test: hiraga a words generated more priming 
in a hiragana sentence completion test than kanji 
words. One possible explanation of this result is that 
manipulation of Japanese writing system is not pure-
ly perceptual, and affects also conceptual processing. 
However, this hypothesis is inconsistent with 
another result of the same experiment showing no 
effects of the cript manipulation on an explicit ver-
sion of the sentence completion test. Since explicit 
tests are supposed to be sensitive to conceptual fac-
tors, if the scri t manipulations has an important 
conceptual component it should have affected also 
the xplicit test. 
Finally, there exist also findings showing the 
effect  o  perceptual manipulations on explicit tests. 
One of this indings was reported by Graf and Ryan 
(1990, Exp. 3), who investigated the effect of a type-
fac  study-test shift on word identification and rec-
ognition. At study, words were presented in a sha-
dow, or in a pudgy font, and at test, words were dis-
played either in the same (S-S, P-P), or in a different 
font (S-P, P-S). During study, subjects either rated 
he readabil ty of the words, or rated how much 
th y i ed them. In the liking rating condition, the 
font man pulation did not affect any of the two tests, 
but in he readabil ty affected both of them. Both 
priming in the word identification test, and recogni-
tion performance was higher when format at study 
and test was the same, than when it was different. 
Two results are pertinent for the present section. 
First, the fi ding that the font manipulation affected 
a perceptual test is an exception to the conclusion, 
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discussed before in this section, that surface form 
manipulations do not usually affect perceptual tests. 
Second, the effects of the font manipulation on the 
recognition test are inconsistent with the idea that 
explicit tests are immune to perceptual manipula-
tions. Graf and Ryan provided explanations for both 
results. 
Graf and Ryan (1990) interpreted their results 
on the basis of an activation view based on the con-
cept of integration (e.g., Mandler, 1980; Graf, Man-
dler, & Haden, 1982; Graf & Mandler, 1984; Man-
dler, Hamson, & Dorfman, 1990). Integration is an 
intra-event process that occurs automa.tically 
whenever an event (e.g., a word) is presented, and 
consist on an increase on the organization of the fea-
tures that constitute the schema of the event. In-
tegration is differentiated from elaboration, which is 
a inter-event process (Mandl~r, Hamson, & Dorfman, 
1990). For example, wheh a list of words is studied, 
integration involves processing the features compos-
ing each word into an organized unit, whereas ela-
boration involves associating each word with other 
words, with situational cues, with prior knowledge, 
etc. Priming on perceptual tests is assumed to de-
pend on integrative processing, whereas explicit per-
formance depends primarily on elaborative proces-
sing. 
According Graf and Ryan, skilled reading in-
volves minimal feature processing, and is based pri-
marily on pre-existing representations. Therefore, 
representations encoded while reading contains few 
details about surface features of the information. 
This explain why in most studies surface manipula-
tions do not affect perceptual tests. However, when 
feature processing increases, e.g., due to an unfamil-
iar format or a physical study task, integrative pro-
cessing yields a distinctive representation containing 
format-specific information. Such representation is 
more likely to be redintegrated at test when items 
are presented in the same, than in a different format. 
This assumption explain the effects of the font man-
ipulation in word identification in Graf and Ryan's 
(1990) third experiment. The integration/ of ela-
boration view can also explain the effects of the 
study-test font shift on recognition performance, be-
cause according this view integration plays also a 
role in recognition, particularly at short delays 
(Mandler, 1980, 1988): recognition cues trigger a 
~~~  
reintegration process, originating a feeling of fami-
liarity that is us d as a basis for recognition judg-
ments. 
In sum, Graf & Ryan (1990) showed that a per-
ceptual manipulation can affect recognition perform-
ance. According the integration/elaboration view, 
these effects occur because, under certain conditions, 
recognition judgments are based on familiarity, 
which reflects the same redintegrative processes 
underlying priming. The idea that recognition judg-
ments can influenced by priming effects was also 
proposed by Jacoby & Dallas (1981). In tests like 
word iden ification, priming effects appear as per-
ceptual fluency, i.e. an increased accuracy or speed 
to iden fy some words. In a recognition test too, 
primed words will be perceived more fluently, pro-
ducing a feeling of familiarity that induce subjects to 
judge these words as old. Johnston, Dark, & Jacoby 
(1985) corroborated this idea by having subjects 
first id n ify an item, and then judge it old or new. 
Items judged old w re identified faster than items 
judged new, suggesting that the probability to judge 
an item old depends on the fluency with which it is 
perce ved. If the eff cts of perceptual manipulations 
on the recognition test occur because this test is also 
sensitive o priming, then they are not inconsistent 
with the main theoretical accounts of priming. In the 
ame way LOP effects in word fragment completion 
can be explained by assuming that this test involves 
also a conceptual component (Challis & Brodbeck, 
1992), the effects o  perceptual manipulation on rec-
ognition can be accounted by the hypothesis that 
recognition has a perceptual component. 
More difficult will be to explain significant 
effects of a perceptual manipulation in an explicit 
test unlikely to have a perceptual component, such 
as free recall. Such finding was recently reported by 
H nt and Toth (1990). These authors investigated 
the effect of orthographic distinctiveness on word 
fragment completion, perceptual identification and 
free recall. The manipulation of orthographic distinc-
tiveness involves  comparison between orthographi-
cally common (e.g., sleet) and orthographically dis-
tinctive words (e.g., sphilex). Since orthography is a 
surface feature assumed to influence visual sensory 
processes, thi manipulation can be classified as a 
pe ceptual manipulation. In conformity with 
accepted notions, o thographic distinctiveness pro-
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duced a marked effect on word fraginent completion, 
with orthographically distinctive words yielding 
more priming than orthographically common words. 
Priming on the perceptual identification test was not 
affected by the manipulation. The surprising result 
of this experiment was that the free recall showed 
the same patter as word fragment completion: 
orthographically distinctive words were better recal-
led than orthographically common words. Although 
puzzling, the effect orthographic distinctiveness on 
free recall is a reliable phenomenon. 
According Hunt and Toth (1990), the effects of 
this manipulation occur because orthographically 
distinctive words are easier to discriminate, and 
hence, are accessed more precisely during retrieval. 
They suggest that both free recall and fragment com-
pletion require the production of a particular word, 
and benefit by enhanced precision of lexical repro-
duction. In perceptual identification, this effect is 
neutralized by the fact that orthographically distinc-
tive words require more processing time, and are in 
disadvantage in brief presentations. The effects of a 
perceptual manipulations on free r~call are inconsis-
tent with the two main theoretical accounts to impli-
cit memory. Unlike recognition, the free recall test 
does not Provide perceptual information, and hence 
it is difficult to assume that it involves redintegra-
tive processing, or is affected by perceptual fluency. 
An alternative explanation is that the orthographic 
distinctiveness manipulation is not a purely percep-
tual manipulation. Hunt and Toth (1990) acknow-
ledge that the idea that orthographic distinctiveness 
effects depends on conceptual processing is difficult 
to eliminate, but discarded it on the grounds that the 
clustering of OD and OC words was not significant 
(Hunt & Mitchell, 1982), and reports that WFC does 
not depend on semantic search (Nelson, Keelaean, 
and Negrao, 1989). The moderate assumption that 
orthographic distinctiveness involves a conceptual 
component is probably still more difficult to exclude. 
The three types of inconsistent findings re-
viewed in this section are difficult to account for 
both of the two standard theoretical accounts. The 
data-driven/conceptually-driven view cannot easily 
explain why surface form manipulations do not 
usually attenuate priming on perc~ptual tests. As 
discussed later, Roediger & Blaxt6n (1987b) sug-
gested that the amount of mismatch produced by this 
manipulations is minimal compared to other study-
test shifts uch as modality, and hence, considerable 
d fferent form priming after surface manipulations is 
consis ent with the data-driven/conceptually-driven 
notion. However, as noticed before, the change in 
perceptual form involved in surface manipulations is 
considerable. As for the effect of script on the con-
ceptual s ntence completion test, the data-
driven/conceptually-driven view could argue that 
the script manipulatio involve a conceptual factor, 
or that conceptual tests involve a perceptual compo-
nent. However, the first idea is inconsistent with the 
n ll effects of s ript on an explicit test, and the 
second with findings showing that conceptual tests 
are not affected by other perceptual manipulations, 
such as modality (Srinivas & Roediger, 1989). Final-
ly, the effe ts of a font shift on recognition and an 
orthographic distinctiveness manipulation on free-
recall are nconsis ent with the notion that explicit 
tests is b sically conceptually-driven. A data-driven 
component could be assumed in recognition, but is 
implausibl in a free-recall test. 
The PRS view has also difficulties to account 
for the inconsistent findings reviewed in this sec-
tion. Fi st, failures to find a reduction of priming on 
perceptual tests as an effect of surface form shift 
does n t ha monize with the idea that perceptual 
priming is based o  a pre-semantic, hyperspecific 
memory system. Second, script effects on the sent-
ence com letion test does not agree with the idea 
that conceptual priming is based on semantic mem-
o y, a system assum d to store abstract representa-
ti ns. Finally, the effects of perceptual manipulations 
o explicit test does not fully harmonize with the 
ide  that episodic memory is affected primarily by 
the meaning of the information. However, Iike the 
data-driven/conceptually-driven view, the PRS view 
could partially account for many of the aforemen-
t oned findings on the basis of the notion that mem-
ory tests are not factor-pure, but involve a mixture 
of components. Fo  example, explicit tests might re-
le t also per eptual priming, and hence, be sensitive 
to perceptual shifts. 
Generate ca  be better than read also on percep-
tual tests 
A third group of evidence inconsistent with the 
standard data were provided by studies showing 
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that, under certain circumstances, the generate con-
dition can produce equal or more priming than the 
read condition on perceptual tests. One of these cir-
cumstances occur when words are generated from 
perceptual cues. In the typical generation paradigm, 
subjects generate words from conceptual cues, Iike 
an antonym (e.g.. Jacoby, 1983;hot- ???), a related 
word and the first letter of the target (e.g., Blaxton, 
1989; hawh-e:); a short sentence with a blank and 
the initial letter of the target (e.g., Srinivas and 
Roediger, 1990; Heroin is related to c ). Neverthe-
less, a generation effect (generate >read) can be also 
found when subjects generate words from perceptual 
generation cues, Iike word fragments (e.g., BRO M). 
Using this generation paradigm, Glisky and Rabino-
witz (1985), found a generation effect on a recogni-
tion test. They also found that this generation effect 
increased when, before making each recognition 
judgment, subjects generated the targets from the 
same fragments used at study. The authors proposed 
that in addition to a general encoding factor, genera-
tion effects may also reflect the overlap between 
study and test operations. 
Following Glisky and Rabinowitz (1985), Gar-
diner (1988) investigated the effect of the generating 
from fragments on the WFC. He found that, unlike 
generation from conceptual cues (e.g., Blaxton, 
1989), generation from fragments produce as much 
priming as the read condition, even when the same 
conditions produce a generation effect in a recogni-
tion performance. Moreover, when generation and 
test cues are identical, the typical negative genera-
tion effect in WFC is reversed, and the generate con-
dition produces more priming than the read condi-
tion. Gardiner (1988) interpreted these result as 
supporting the transfer-appropriate principle. When 
words are generated from conceptual cues, priming 
is larger in the read condition, because study/test 
match is greater in that condition. In contrast, when 
words are generated from the same fragments used 
at test, priming in the generate condition surpass 
priming in the read condition, because there is more 
study-test overlap in the generate than in the read 
condition. 
Toth and Hunt (1990, Exp. 1) found in the per-
ceptual identification test results similar to those of 
Gardiner (1988) . Read (dil40saur) and generation 
(d leosaur) at study was ortogonally crossed with 
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identification of complete words (dilcosaur) or frag-
ents (d nosalbr) at t st. Identification of complete 
words (diw saur) was not affected by the study man-
ipulation, but i entification of fragments (d wosaur) 
was better for words generated (d leosaur) than for 
words read (dinosaur). This experiment indicate that 
generation effects in word identification, as in the 
case of WFC (Gardiner 1988), depends on the rein-
statement of perceptual operations (d leosaur-d 
140saur). According the authors, reinstatement was 
not critical for complete words, because what is 
facilitated are the sublexical processes involved in 
the completion of fragments. 
Other evidence suggest that reinstatement of 
perceptual operations is not the only factor mediat-
ing the effects of generation on perceptual tests. 
Some studies, for example, have found that generate 
can produce as much priming as read in perceptual 
tests, even when words are generated from concep-
tual cues. Schwa tz (1989), for example, investigated 
the effects of the ead/generate manipulation on a 
cued recall test, a perceptual identification, and a 
version of the word stem completion, she called letter 
addition test. In the cues of the last test, only the last 
letter have to b  dded (e.g.,chim ) to complete one 
of two possible words ( .g., chimp, chime). In the gen-
eration condition, words were generated from short 
questions and the first letter of the target (e.g., the 
opposite of sour-S). Consistently with the standard no-
tions, gener tion enhanced recall, but attenuated 
primi g on perceptual identification. Surprisingly, in 
the lett r additio  test, the generate condition pro-
duced as much priming as the read condition. 
Schwartz suggested that, unlike the perceptual iden-
tification which is b ically data-driven, the letter 
addi ion test relies o both data-driven and concep-
tually-driv n processing (Challis & Brodbeck's third 
explanation). Schwartz acknowledged, however, that 
his interpret tion does not harmonize well with the 
fact that the similar word stem completion test is 
usually affected by perceptual (e.g., Graf, Shima-
mura, & Squire, 1985) but not by conceptual man-
ipulations (e.g., G af & Mandler, 1984). 
Even Schwartz' (1989) finding is suggestive, the 
fact that the l tter addition test is not a typical per-
ceptual test allow  the possibility to attribute her 
finding of to a par cularity of this test. Neverthe-
less, similar results have been found with common 
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perceptual tests, such as WFC. In Hirshman, Snod-
grass, Mindes and Feenan (1990), for example, the 
generate condition yielded better free recall than the 
read condition (Exp. 5), but both conditions pro-
duced similar priming on the WFC (Expts. 4 and 5). 
Hirshman et al. (1990) suggested the failure to repli-
cate negative generation effects in WFC (e.g., Blax-
ton, 1989) could be related to a difference on the 
generating procedure: instead of generating from a 
word, their subjects generated from a sentence with 
a blank. Hirshman et al. (1990) speculated that the 
sentence generation paradigm could involve more or 
different semantic information so as to equal the 
read condition, even in the absence of perceptual 
overlap. Hirshman et al. (1990) explained their re-
sults by assuming the existence of two conceptual 
representations. This hypothesis will be described 
later. 
The role of conceptual factors were also empha-
sized by Hunt and Toth (1990). In their second ex-
periment, subjects read or generated words in the 
context of associatively related words (e.g., mop-
BRQOM; mop-BRO M), and later identified them 
paired either with the same or with different, though 
associated, context words (e.g., mop-BROOM; dirty-
BROOM). Identification was better when the study 
context was reinstated, and a generation effect 
occurred, but only in the "same context" condition. 
That is, when the conceptual context was reinstated, 
the generate condition produce more priming than 
the read condition, even though there was less per-
ceptual ov. erlap in the generate (mop-BRO M; mop-
BROOM) than in the read condition (mop-BROOM; 
mop-BROOM). According Toth and Hunt (1990) 
these results indicate that, in addition to the overlap 
of perceptual operations, generation effects in word 
identification reflect also a repetition of conceptual 
o perations. 
How do standard views of priming account for 
the foregoing evidence? As was said before, the 
data-driven/conceptually-driven view assumes. that 
perceptual tests, which are data-driven, should be 
favored by study conditions that emphasize data-
driven processing, Iike read, rather than for those 
that underscore conceptually-driven processing, such 
as generate. This view could argue that the percep-
tual tests employed in the foregoing experiments 
were primarily conceptually-driven, rather than 
data-driven, or that the generation paradigms util-
ized was primarily data-driven, rather than concep-
tually-d iven (C llis & Brodbeck's second and third 
explanations). The first argument can be easily ap-
plied to Schwartz' (1989) finding, inasmuch as the 
letter addition test is a largely unexplored test. Yet, 
this argument cannot easily account for Hirshman et 
al's (1990) results, because the WFC has been clas-
sified as data-driven, on the basis of the readlgener-
ate manipula ion (Blaxton, 1989). The second argu-
ment seems to account well for generations effects 
found by using a generation-from-fragments para-
digm (Gardiner, 1988; Toth and Hunt, 1990). It 
seems reasonable to ssume that when generation is 
don  from fragments rather than from conceptual 
cu s, generation involves more data-driven, than 
conceptually- riven processing. Nevertheless, this 
hypothesis is inconsistent with the fact that genera-
tion-f om-fragments produces generation effects also 
on recognition (e.g.. Glisky & Rabinowitz, 1985; 
Gardin r, 1988), which is supposed to depend pri-
marily on conceptually-driven processing. Moreover, 
he gen rate condition can yield more priming than 
the read condi ion in word identification, even when 
the generate condition involves less perceptual rein-
sta ment than the read condition (Totb & Hunt, 
1990). 
As for he PRS v ew, it assumes that perceptual 
tests reflects perceptual priming, which is based on 
a pre-s mantic system, extremely sensitive to per-
cep ual aspects of the stimuli. Generatiorl effects on 
perceptual tests that appear only when study and 
test cues involve the same perceptual information 
(BRO M; BRO M) are consistent with this view. 
Generation effects when perceptual information is 
differ nt (mop-BRO M; mop-BROOM) can be ex-
plained on the assumption that when a context word 
is included, the test involve also conceptual priming, 
and like conceptual tests, it shows generation effects 
(Blaxton, 1989). In sum, the PRS view seems to be 
able to accommodate the inconsistent findings re-
viewe  in this section. 
Tes s belo ging t  the same group can be dis-
sociated 
Th standard data comprise dissociations be-
twe n explicit tests, perceptual tests, and conceptual 
tests. These dissociations support the distinction be-
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tween these two types of tests, and, in general, the 
three standard theoretical accounts. However, dis-
sociations have not only been found between tests 
belonging to different groups, but also between tests 
that are usually classified within the same group. 
According to the standard accounts of priming, dis-
sociations between memory tests occur when they 
tap different forms of processing, or different mem-
ory systems. Dissociations, then, are not predicted 
between tests assumed to tap the same kind of pro-
cessing, or the same memory system. Nevertheless, 
four groups of such dissociations are reviewed in 
this section. Dissociations between different explicit 
tests (e,g., dissociations betw. een recall and recogni-
tion) are not reviewed here due to space limitations. 
First, several studies have reported dissocia-
tions between different perceptual tests, in particu-
larly between completion tests and identification 
tests. One of these reports was mentioned before: 
Schwartz (1989) found more priming on the read 
than on the generate condition on a word identifica-
tion test, but comparable priming on these conditions 
on a letter addition test. She suggested that priming 
in identification relies more on data-driven than on 
conceptually-driven processing, whereas priming in 
completion relies on both kinds of processing. Com-
pletion and identification test has been diverged al-so 
by contingent dissociations. Witherspoon and Mosco-
vitch (1989), for example, found stochastic inde-
pendence between a word fragment completion and a 
perceptual identification test. Similarly, Perruchet & 
Baveux (1989) found low correlation between these 
two perceptual tests. 
Second, dissociations between two perceptual 
tests can occur even when both tests are based on 
the same kind of cues. Weldon and Roediger (1987, 
Exp. 4), for example, found a dissociation between a 
WFC, and a picture fragment identification test. The 
cues of both tests are fragments; fragments of words 
in the former, or fragments of pictures in the latter. 
Subjects studied words and pictures, and then per-
formed one of the two tests. The results showed that 
words generated more priming than pictures on the 
WFC, whereas the reverse was true on the picture 
fragment identification. According the authors, this 
cross-over dissociation supports the transfer 
appropriate processing principle, because perform-
ance was better in the conditions with greater study-
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overlap. It is interesting to notice, however, that de-
spite upp rting the TAP principle, this dissociation 
is not pr dicted by the data-driven/conceptually-
driven view. 
Third, dissociations have been found even be-
tween two versions of the same test. Hayman and 
Tulving (1989) found stochastic independence be-
tween to successive WFC, that differed only on the 
l tters provided by their fragments. For example, in 
th first WFC the word AARDVARK was cued by 
A D RK, wh reas in the second, it was cued 
by the compl mentary fragment AR VA 
Wh the same tests were presented with explicit 
instructions (cu d recall tests), the two tests were 
moderately depende t According the authors, these 
results support the idea that, unlike episodic and 
semantic memory, he system that supports priming 
i  not bas d on uni zed or integrated traces, but on 
the "strengthening of particular stimulus-response 
connectrons" (p. 953). When there are focal traces 
the same information can be accessed through diffe-
rent cues, but when they do not exist, access de-
pends on the particular perceptual structure of the 
cues. This assumption can also explain the contin-
gent dissociat on between WFC and WI found by 
Withersp on & Moscovitch (1989), because the per-
ceptual structure of the cues of these two tests is 
quite different. 
Finally, dissociations can be found between 
different data-driven tests, and between different 
conceptually-d iven ests. As was said before, amne-
sic show impaired performance on explicit tests, but 
not on implicit tests, regardless the data-driven or 
conceptually-driven nature of the tests used. Evi-
denc  from normal subjects was recently provided 
by Tenpenny & Shoben (1992). They found a dis-
sociat on between two conceptually-driven tests. 
Subjects _studied atypical exemplars of categories 
paired with a string of Xs, with a typical, or with an 
atypical member of the same category, and then re-
ceived on of wo tests. In the semantic cued recall 
test, subjects used typical or atypical members of 
the target's category as a cue for the target. In the 
ca egory membership ve ificati014 tash they saw a categ-
ory label foll wed by the target and a typical or aty-
pical exemplar of the same category, and had to indi-
cate whether both items belonged to the category. 
The results showed a dissociation between the two 
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te.sts: semantic cued recall was greater with atypical 
test cues than with typical ones, whereas the oppo-
site was true in the verification task. These effects 
were localized on the conditions in which typicality 
at study and test matched. In the semantic cued re-
call test, atypical cues were superior only for words 
studied with an atypical context word; in the veri-
fication task, typical cues were better only for target 
studied with typical context words. 
Tenpenny and Shoben (1992) also found a dis-
sociations between two data-driven tests, graphemic 
cued recall and WFC. Graphemic cued recall showed 
better performance for words studied in the context 
of a graphemically related word, than for those stu-
died in the context of a semantically related word, 
whereas WFC was not affected by the manipulation. 
Moreover, graphemic cued recall tended to be better 
on low-frequency words, whereas WFC was better 
for high-frequency words. Tenpenny and Shoben in-
terpreted their results as supporting the transfer 
appropriate processing notion, but undermining the 
data-driven/conceptually-driven distinction: per-
formance was a function of the overlap between 
study and test operations, but dissociations were 
found between two conceptually-driven tests, and be-
tween two data-driven tests. 
Dissociations between tests assumed to belong 
to the same group represent a problem for all the 
two standard theoretical accounts of priming. As 
Schwartz (1989) suggested, the data-driven/ of con-
ceptually-driven view can account for dissociations 
between identification and courpletion tests on the 
assumptiow that the former is fundamentally data-
driven, whereas the latter involves both data-driven 
and conceptually-driven processing. This assumption 
could be also used to explain contingent dissocia-
tions between these two tests (Witherspoon & Mos-
covitch, 1989). This explanation is less convincing 
when the tests dissociated are very similar, Iike the 
word fragment completion and the picture fragment 
ideritification (Weldon and Roediger, 1987), and 
even less they are two versions of the same test 
(Hayman & Tulving (1989). Finally, the data-
driven/conceptually-driven view cannot easily 
account for the dissociations between two concep-
tually-driven, and between two data-driven tests 
found by Tenpenny & Shoben (1992). 
The PRS view could account for dissociations 
betw en identification and completion tests by 
as uming that identification tests depend primarily 
on PRS, whereas completion tests depend on both 
PRS and semantic memory. In other words, identi-
fication tests reflect mainly perceptual priming, 
whereas c mpletion tests reflect both perceptual and 
conceptual priming. As was said before, this view 
can accou t for dissociations between two versions 
f WFC on the assumption that PRS does not store 
integrated memory traces. This view can also ex-
plai he dissociations found by Tenpenny & Shoben 
(1992) because these issociation occurred between 
expl cit and implicit ests, which are assumed to de-
pend o different memory systems. In sum, the PRS 
view seems to provi e a somewhat more consistent 
theoretical account for dissociations between tests 
tha  belong to the same group. 
Th re is different form priming on perceptual 
tests -As was said before, earliest studies failed to 
fi d priming in the absence of perceptual overlap. 
They showed, for example, that perceptual identi-
fication w s not facilitated by hearing a word 
(Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Morton, 1979), or generat-
ing it (Morton, 1979; Winnick & Daniel, 1970). 
These original reports were consistent with the idea 
that perceptual tes s reflect primarily data-driven 
proce sing, or are ba ed in a pre-semantic percep-
tual rep esentation system. However, several studies 
have shown that s g ificant priming can be found 
not only wh n surface form, modality, symbol type 
and language of study and test items match, but also 
when the do not match. These results suggest that 
pr ming in perceptual tests is not mediated exclu-
sively by perceptual operations. Manipulations that 
involve study-test perceptual mismatch can be di-
vided in five groups: surface form, modality, genera-
tion and nference, symbol type, and language. Diffe-
rent form p iming has been found in all of them. 
First, study-test shift on surface form within 
the same modality are assumed to involve the slight-
est form of percep ual mismatch between study and 
test items. M st of the studies that manipulated case, 
cript, typefont, ty ography, or voice, have found 
significant different form priming. Moreover, in 
many of them priming in the different form priming 
was as large as in the same form priming (e.g., Carr, 
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Brown, & Charalambous, 1989; Clarke & Morton, 
1983; ; Levy & Kirsner, 1989; Scarborough, Cor-
tese, & Scarborough, 1977). In the study reviewed 
before. Graf and Ryan (1990) suggested that appear-
ance shifts attenuate priming only when there is an 
extensive perceptual analysis during encoding, as an 
effect of the unfamiliar format of the stimuli, to the 
study task. 
Second, a more radical form of perceptual mis-
match occurs in study-test modality shifts. Unlike 
the previous group of manipulations, modality shifts 
generally produce a marked attenuation on priming 
in the mismatching condition (e.g., Clarke & Morton, 
1983; Blaxton, 1989; Jacoby & Dallas, 1981). 
Nevertheless, in most studies, priming in the diffe-
rent-modality condition, although smaller, was still 
significant. For example, Bassili, Smith, &: MacLeod 
(1989, Exp. 1) performed a complete manipulation of 
modality and compared the effect of visual and audi-
tory presentations on visual and auditory stem com-
pletion tests. Results showed more priming in the 
same-modality conditions (36.5 "/~), but also a signifi-
cant amount of priming in the different-modality con-
ditions (22.9~/*). According the authors, these results 
underscore the role of non-perceptual processing in 
priming. An alternative hypothesis is that cross-
modal priming occurs because subjects form an im-
age of the stimuli in the other modality (Jacoby & 
Witherspoon, 1982). In fact, Roediger & Blaxton 
(1987b) found that auditorily presented words pro-
duced more priming in a WFC when subjects were 
instructed to imagine the words in print. The imag-
ery explanation is difficult to eliminate, but some 
methods have been proposed, and are discussed la-
ter. At any rate, the imagery explanation cannot 
account for priming in the mismatching condition in 
surface form manipulations. It is unlikely, for exam-
ple, that subjects that see a word in lowercase would 
imagine it in uppercase, or vice versa. 
A third type of perceptual mismatch occur when 
subjects do not actually perceive the targets during 
the study phase. One of these conditions is the 
generate condition of the read/generate ma:nipula-
tion, which apparently does not involve any percep-
tual input, but usually produces significant priming 
on perceptual tests. It would be possible to argue, 
however, that perceptual input in the generate condi-
tion is not completely absent. First, subjects typical-
ly say gen rated words aloud, and hence, there is an 
auditory inp t; and second, generation cues, even 
conceptual ones, usually provide a portion of the 
target ( .g., hawh, :). Nevertheless, these two factors 
d es not seem to have a critical effect on priming in 
the generation condition. Schwartz (1989), for exam-
ple, compared generation aloud with silent genera-
tion (Exp. 1), and conceptual cues with or without 
the first letter of the target (Expts. 2a and 2b) and 
did not found any s gnificant effect of these man-
ipulations. 
Accordi g Hirsh an et al. (1990), significant 
priming in the generate condition in word and pic-
ture fr gment completion tests is mediated by a con-
ceptual representation. Since priming and free recall 
performance in the r experiments were not corre-
lated, they suggested that the conceptual representa-
tion that mediates generation priming on completions 
tests is not the s me the mediates generation effects 
o  free recall. According the authors, the generation 
task involve two component search processes: an ini-
tial elaborative search process based on the informa-
t on provided by the generation cue, and a subse-
quent perceptual search process based on the informa-
tion generat d by the previous search. The first 
search strengthens associations between the elabo-
rated information originating an elaborative semal4tics 
representation; the second search strengthens the 
representations of the simultaneously activated 
semantic, visual, and phonological information, and 
constitute a perceptual semantics representation. 
Whereas generation effects on free recall depends 
primarily on elaborative semantics, generation prim-
i g in identification test is based mainly on percep-
tual sem tics. 
Another condition that produce priming in the 
ab ence of perceptual input occurs when words are 
inferred at study. In Bassili et al. (1989, Exp. 2) 
subjects saw or heard sentences like "The boat 
traveled underwater" and inferred the subject noun 
(s~bmaril4e), or se tences lrke "The su;bmar~ne 
traveled underwater" and categorized the subject 
noun (boat). Presented words produced more priming 
(22.40/0) in visual and auditory stem-completion tests, 
but nferred wo ds produced significant priming 
(15.30/0), in a level comparable to the cross-modality 
co ditions (16.70/0). The authors concluded that 
priming in the inference and cross-modality condi-
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tions "reflect the effect of the same conceptually 
driven processing operations" (p. 451). However,, as 
in the case of cross-modality priming, priming in the 
generate and the inference condition can be 
accounted in terms of an imagery explanation. 
Fourth, a radical form of mismatch occurs when 
subjects are presented with pictures and tested on 
words, or vice versa. Weldon and Roediger (1987) 
found that words produce more priming than pic-
tures on the WFC, but pictures produce also a signi-
ficant amount of priming. As in the cases of modal-
ity, generation, and inference, an imagery explana-
tion is also applicable here: pictures produced prim-
ing in WFC because subjects were covertly labeling 
them. In order to investigate this possibility, Weldon 
and Roediger's (1987, Exp. 2) had instructed their 
subjects either to label the pictures, or to perform a 
study task that obstructed labeling, to study careful-
ly the details of the pictures. Even the label condi-
tion yielded better free recall performance than the 
picture -details condition, both produced a similar 
amount of cross-symbol priming on WFC. They also 
found (Exp. 3), that picture priming in WFC was 
similar regardless whether the names of the pictures 
were thought, mouthed silently, or said aloud (see 
also Brown, Neblett, Jones, and Mitchell, 1991). 
These experiments suggest that cross-symbol prim-
ing is not the effect of covert labeling. 
Cross-symbol priming has been also found when 
study items are words and test items are pictures. 
Hirshman et al. (1990), for example, found priming 
on a picture fragment identification test for words 
generated from sentences with blanks, but not for 
words read in the context of a sentence (Exp. 2 & 
3). These results suggests that cross-symbol priming 
is mediated by conceptual processing, but the imag-
ery explanation is also possible. In the generation 
condition, subjects could have constructed mental 
images of the referents of the words, which are 
"data-driven representations" (Hirshman et al., 
1990, p. 640) similar to the pictures of the test. 
However, if generation priming occurs because sub-
jects imagine objects similar to the cues of the test, 
it should not occur when test cues are verbal like in 
the standard WFC, but it does (Hirshman et al., 
1990, Exp.4). Like Weldon & Roediger's (1987, 
Expts. 2 & 3) experiments, this suggest that the im-
agery explanation is not enough to account for cross-
symbol priming on perceptual tests. 
Even significant in many cases, cr0~s-symbol 
ng is usually much smaller than intra-symbol 
primi g-ab ut o e fourth, according Weldon & 
Roediger (1987). However, Brown et al. (1991) 
found t at thi difference exists when, as in most 
studies, symbol ype is manipulated within-subjects 
with mixed lists Expts. 2, and 6), but not when it is 
varied between-subje ts with unmixed lists (Expts. 
1, Ia, and 5). According Brown et al. (1991), when 
word and pictures are presented in unmixed lists, 
subjects attention is not particularly drawn by the 
erceptual features of the stimuli, and there is a 
g n ral lexical activation of word units, regardless 
the symbol-type of the prime. In contrast, when 
words a d pi ures are presented in mixed lists con-
dition, subjects attention is focused on perceptual fe-
atures of the stimuli to the detriment of lexical pro-
cessi g, and h nce, the test is affected by perceptual 
overlap. 
Finally, priming h s also been found in biling-
uals when words are presented in one language and 
tested n a different language. Most studies that in-
vestigated language manipulations did not find signi-
ficant long-term int rlingual priming on perceptual 
tests (e.g., Durgunoglu & Roediger, 1987; Kirsner, 
Smith, Lockhart, K ng, & Jain, 1984; Scarborough, 
Gerard & Cortese, 1984). However, Smith (1991) 
has recently demonstrated that interlingual priming 
occur in WFC when words are read in sentences 
(Exp. 1), r inferred from sentences (Expts. I & 2), 
but n t when words are studied in a random list 
(Exp. 2). The critical factor seems to be the sentence 
context, rather than degree of elaboration, because 
Durgunoglu & Roediger (1987) failed to found in-
t rl gual priming in WFC, even when words were 
studied elaboratively (forming images study task). 
According Smith (1991) the two languages of a 
bilingual are represented separately at the lexical 
level, but feed into a common semantic representa-
tion. Cross-languag  ransfer is difficult to find in 
perceptual test , ch as lexical decision or WFC, 
because they rely prjmarily on lexical representa-
tions. How ver, sente ce processing involves a kind 
of conceptual integration that encourages subjects to 
recruit s mantic information while performing the 
WFC, and hence, interlingual priming occurs in this 
test.
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The foregoing studies about surface form, mod-
ality, generation and inference, symbol type, and lan-
guage have reported significant different form prim-
ing in different perceptual tests. Roediger and Blax-
ton (1987b) and Kirsner and Dunn (1985) tried to 
find an pattern in the results of such manipulations. 
Roediger and Blaxton (1987b) reviewed the effect of 
typography, modality, symbol, and language man-
ipulations on WFC, and proposed that the magnitude 
of priming depends on the similarity between data 
processed at study and the fragments of the test. 
Priming is maximal when presentation is visual and 
typography matches the one of the test (0.27). It de-
creases slightly when typography mismatches (0.23), 
but considerably when words are presentated au-
ditorily (0.16). Finally, it is very small for pictures 
(0.07), and almost null for words presented in other 
language (0.02). According Roediger and Blaxton 
(1987b), these results support the notion the WFC 
is a data-driven test. 
Kirsner and Dunn (1985) summarized the re-
sults of 28 experiments involving lexical decision, 
naming, fragment completion, and semantic classi-
fication tests, by means of an index called relative 
primin;g, obtained by dividing the amount of priming 
in the mismatching condition by the amount of prim-
ing in the matching condition. Their results indi-
cated that priming is essentially unaffected by 
changes. in voice (RP =0.98), or case (RP =0.84), is 
mark.edly attenuated by changes in modality (RP = 
0.38), and typically eliminated by changes in lan-
guage (RP =0.05). The arrangement of the effects of 
study-test manipulations is similar to the one found 
by Roediger and Blaxton (1987b), but Kirsner and 
colleagues proposed a different explanation. 
Kirsner, Milech, and Standen (1983) proposed 
that different languages involve separate lexical rep-
resentations, and that within each language lexical 
representations have two levels: modality-specific, 
and modality-iludepel4dent . When study and test items 
are in the ~ame language and modality, even if they 
differ in voice or case, both modality-specific and 
modality-independent representations operate and 
hence priming is maximal. When th.ey differ in mod-
ality, only modality-independent representations 
operate, and priming is intermediate. Finally, when 
they differ in language, neither of the two levels 
operates, and there is no priming. 
~~  
Kirsn r, Dunn and Standen (1991) proposed a 
more c mplex model in which the attributes of a sti-
mulus are aut matically analyzed through successive 
levels of increasing abstraction. The first level is 
sensitive to surface form (e.g., case, voice), modality 
and language; the second level is sensitive to modal-
ity and language; the third is sensitive only to lan-
guage; and the fourth level is sensitive only to mean-
ing, so that words expressing the same concept in 
d fferent languages have a common representation. 
Changes in case or voice affect only the first level 
and produce litt e or no attenuation on priming. 
C ang  in modality affect the first and second level 
and produce a marked reduction on priming. Cross-
modality priming is based on the third level. Finally, 
changes in language u ually eliminates priming, but 
the fourth l vel can account for some cases of interl-
ingual priming (e.g.. Kirsner et al., 1984). 
How do sta dard theories of priming account 
for the existence of priming effects on perceptual 
tests in conditions in which there is not perceptual 
overlap between study and test stimuli? As said be-
fore, Roediger & Blaxton (1987b) interpreted the 
effect of study-test manipulations on WFC as sup-
porting the data-driven nature of this test. The fact 
tha  in these manipulations priming declines as per-
ceptual over ap decreases is consistent with the 
data-driven/conc ptually-driven view. However, to 
arrang manipulations in a continuum according the 
proporti n of perceptual overlap they involve is a 
problematic task. For example, it is difficult to say 
tha spoken and printed words are more perceptual-
ly similar than words in different languages, because 
the"similarity" between spoken and printed words is 
not erceptual but lexical. At any rate, the main dif-
ficulty for the data-driven/conceptually-driven view 
is to explain different form priming. If priming in 
p r eptual tests reflects transfer of data-driven pro-
cessing, why does it occur in the absence of percep-
tual overlap. One possible answer is the "mixture 
explanation": perceptual tests are not pure data-
driven measures, but involve also conceptually-
driven processing. However, if different form prim-
ing is mediated by conceptual processing, why does 
it rarely occur between words expressing the same 
concept in different languages? 
The PRS view cannot easily explain different 
form priming on perceptual tests either. Since PRS is 
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assumed to be pre-semantic system extremely sensi-
tive perceptual attributes of the stimuli, it follows 
that even small changes on surface form should eli-
minate priming based on this system. One possible 
answer again is the mixture hypothesis: different 
form priming on perceptual tests is not perceptual 
priming based on PRS, but conceptual priming based 
on semantic memory. Since semantic memory is 
usually assumed to stores abstract representations, 
it is reasonable to assume also that conceptual prim-
ing might occur in the absence of perceptual overlap. 
However, as said before, if different form priming is 
based on semantic representations, why is interling-
ual priming so difficult to obtain. 
It seems that the main difficulty of the two stan-
dard theoretical accounts to explain different form 
priming is the perceptual-conceptual dichotomy. 
Since different form priming is obviously not a per-
ceptual phenomenon, it should be a conceptual one, 
but then, it should occur across language, when it 
seldom does. A solution of this problem could be to 
incorporate a third factor in the discussion. This 
was done recently by Weldon (1991), who pointed 
out that priming on perceptual tests depends not 
only on perceptual and conceptual factors, but also 
on lexical factors. She arrived to this conclusion af-
ter a systematic comparison of the roles of surface 
encoding, Iexical access, and conceptual encoding in 
priming on two perceptual tests, WFC and percep-
tual identification. In her first experiment, she com-
pared priming produced by words read, heard, or 
generated, and by pictures. Priming was maximal in 
the condition involving perceptual, Iexical, and con-
ceptual overlap (read: 0.25), decreased markedly in 
the conditions entailing only lexical and conceptual 
overlap (auditory: 0.08; generate: 0.12), and was not 
significant in the condition assumed to embroil only 
conceptual overlap (picture: 0.03). These results 
suggest that lexical access is critical for priming. 
In her second experiment, she contrasted the 
roles of surface encoding and lexical access. Subjects 
read words (e.g., tropics) and anagrams (e.g., tripocs). 
Half of the subjects read the anagrams as nonwords, 
but half were instructed to mentally interchange the 
vowels to form words (e.g., tripocs). Since the vowels 
were absent in the fragments of the WFC 
(e.g., r p cs), study-test perceptual overlap was 
identical for words and for anagrams. In the percep-
tual identification test, in contrast, words (e.g., tro-
pics, tropics) had a better match, than anagrams (e.g., 
tripocs, tropics). The results indicated that priming in 
the anagram condition occurred only when subjects 
transpo ed the anagrams into words, and not when 
they studied the anagram as nonwords. This result, 
again, underscore the role of lexical access. Percep-
tual overlap, however, is also important, because in 
he pe ceptual identification test, words produced 
more priming than transposed anagrams. 
In her fourth ex eriment, she compared the 
e fects of lexical access and conceptual processing. 
In this exper ment, Iexical access was kept constant, 
a d study-test conceptual overlap was manipulated. 
Target words (e.g., black, scotch) were studied in 
compou ds that prese ved the individual meaning of 
the target (e.g., backbird, scotch bottle) or in com-
pounds that al ered the individual meaning of the 
target (e.g., blackmail, scotch tape). Priming in WFC 
wa  better for t  same-meaning compounds than for 
the diff rent-meaning compounds. In contrast, prim-
ing in perceptual identification was not affected by 
the manipulation of meaning. These results suggest 
that WFC is more sensitive to conceptual factors 
h n perceptual identification, and that is inadequate 
to cla m that pr ming depends only on lexical access 
or only on c nceptu l processing. According Weldon 
(1991, p. 538) "slirface processing, Iexical access, 
and conceptual ro ssing can all affect priming to 
differ nt degrees, depending on the particular encod-
ing conditions and p iming tests under considera-
tion." 
In sum, several studies' concerned with the 
effects of surface form, modality, generation, infer-
ence, symbol typ , and language manipulations have 
found significant priming on perceptual tests in the 
absence of study-test perceptual overlap. The stan-
dard data-driven/conceptually-driven and PRS views 
cannot easily account for this evidence of different 
form priming. Diff rent form priming cannot be a 
per eptual phenomenon, but it does not seem to be 
alway a conceptual phenomenon. Weldon's (1991) 
results uggest that different form priming depends 
also on lexical access. This idea is not incompatible 
with the standard vi w of priming. On the contrary, 
they can be reformed to incorporate lexical access as 
an important factor. The main modification required 
is an integration of the episodic and the activation 
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accounts of priming mechanisms. The episodic 
account can explain why priming wanes when study-
test perceptual overlap decreases, but the activation 
account can explain why it does not disappear, even 
when perceptual overlap is null. The PRS view, for 
example, can incorporate the lexical factor without 
much effort, because semantic memory is assumed to 
store not only factual knowledge, but also the lex-
icon. Thus, different form priming could reflect con-
ceptual priming, which can be assumed to be sensi-
tive not only to semantic, but also to lexical factors. 
Epilogue 
Comparisons between explicit, perceptual and 
conceptual tests have produced a complex pattern of 
results. At a certain stage of the development the 
priming research, this pattern could be summarized 
in five statements: (1) conceptual manipulations 
affect explicit, and conceptual tests, but not percep-
tual tests; (2) perceptual manipulations affect per-
ceptual tests, but not conceptual and explicit tests; 
(3) generate is better for explicit tests and concep-
tual tests, but read is better for perceptual tests; (4) 
explicit and conceptual tests can be dissociated; and 
(5) there is not different form priming on perceptual 
tests. These fundamental notions constituted the 
grounds in which the standard theoretical accounts 
of priming were built. The data-driven/conceptually-
driven view assumes that memory performance re-
flects the transfer of data-driven and conceptually-
driven processing, and the PRS view attributes per-
formance on different memory tests to different 
memory systems. Both views can account for most of 
the standard data. 
Unfortunately, findings inconsistent with the 
standard data became more and nrore common, and 
today there are counterexamples to each of the five 
basic notions of the standard data: (1) conceptual 
manipulations can also affect perceptual tests; (2) 
perceptual manipulations sometimes do not affect 
perceptual tests and affect explicit tests; (3) generate 
can be better than read also on perceptual t~sts; (4) 
tests belonging to the same group can be dissociated; 
and (5) there is different form priming on perceptual 
tests. Some of these inconsistent findings can be 
accommodated by the standard theor.etical accounts 
by the introduction of small modifications. Ot.her 
?
f ndings are in a more serious disagreement with the 
stand rd theorie , and point out to the need of new 
theoretical ac ounts. At any rate, inconsistent find-
ings are timulating research on priming, and inspir-
ing new theoretical developments. A personal selec-
tion of some enticing issues is presented below. 
Perceptua  and conceptual factors 
As was said before, both the data-driven/ of 
conceptually-driven view and the PRS view assume 
in certain extent a basic perceptual-conceptual dis-
tinction. Likewise, most empirical work on priming 
has assumed this polar distinction. Findings incon-
sistent with the standard data, however, suggest that 
this distinction should be reconsidered. First, the 
istinction does not provide a neat classification of 
encoding and retrieval manipulations. It is question-
able, for exa ple, that perceptual manipulation~ 
affect only erceptual aspects of processing, and 
conceptual manipulations affect only conceptual 
ones. Challis & Brodbeck (1992), discussed the pos-
sibility that the LOP manipulation is not purely con-
ceptual, but that it affects also perceptual proces-
sing. Convers ly, some perceptual manipulations, 
such as symbol- ype shifts, could affect also concep-
tual factors. As for retrieval manipulations, several 
authors have s ggested that perceptual tests involve 
also conceptual factor . The difficulty to manipulate 
perceptual and conceptual factors independently 
could r flect a int insic property of mental opera-
tio s--cha g s on perceptual processing always 
affect concept al processing and vice versa, or simp-
ly a limitation of the present experimental methodol-
ogy. In both case , it would necessary to reexamine 
implicit assumptions about perceptual and concep-
tual components of processing, and develop different 
experimental procedures. 
Second, the p rceptual-conceptual dichotomy 
cannot easily accomodate different form priming 
data. Different form priming is not a perceptual phe-
nomenon, but i does not seem to be solely a concep-
tual phenomenon either. If different form priming 
wer  m diated exclusively by conceptual processing, 
cross-language Pr ming should be as easily to obtain 
as cross-m dality riming, but it is not. The differ-
ence between different modalities and different lan-
guages seems to be that different modalities involve 
the same set of lexical ,representations, whereas 
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different languages do not. The study of Weldon 
(1991) provide strong support for the idea that 
lexical factors play an important role on priming, 
and a method to examine the relation perceptual, 
lexical, and conceptual factors. The shift from a per-
ceptual-conceptual framework, to a perceptual-
lexical-conceptual one would involve important 
changes on the conceptualization of priming phe-
nomena. It could entail, for example, an approxima-
tion of the study-test paradigm and the prime-target 
paradigm. Lexical factors were somewhat neglected 
in the former, but were always central on the latter. 
An increased attention on lexical factors could also 
boost activation accounts of priming, and also hyb-
rid accounts assuming both activation and episodic 
mechanisms of priming. In sum, a reexamination of 
the perceptual-conceptual dichotomy could be the 
origin of one of the most important advances in the 
field of priming. 
Increased attention on neglected factors and in-
teractions 
Some of the studies reviewed in the section con-
cerned with inconsistent finding have shown some 
factors that are not usually considered to affect 
priming, actually do so. One of this factors is 
whether the study list is mixed or unmixed. As re-
viewed before, Challis and Brodbeck (1992) found 
that LOP effects in WFC tend to occur when items 
to be studied physically or semantically are pre-
sented in separate lists, but not when they are pre-
sented in a mixed list. Challis and Brodbeck (1992) 
discussed the possibility that LOP WFC are due to a 
deficiency of perceptual processing in the physical 
condition, and that this insufficiency worsen when 
all the items in the list are processed physically. 
Conversely, they also considered the alternative that 
LOP effects are caused by enhanced perceptual pro-
cessing in the semantic condition, and that this im-
provement occurs specially in the unmixed list con-
_dition. Challis and Brodbeck (1992) found that the 
critical factor is whether the study list is mixed or 
unmixed, and not whether the manipulation is with-
in-or between-subj ects. 
The effects of the mixed-unmixed factor is not 
limited to LOP manipulations. Standard data sug-
gested that the manipulation of symbol type (word 
vs. picture) produced a radical decrement of priming. 
Weldon and R ediger (1987) estimated that cross-
symbol priming is only about one fourth of intra-
symbol primi g. Study-test symbol type shifts, then, 
se med to produce a very large effect. However, 
Brown et al. (1991) found that changing the symbol 
type betwe n study and test attenuates priming 
when, as in most s udies, study list are mixed, but 
not when word and pictures are presented in sepa-
rate study lists. According Brown et al. (1991), 
whe  lists ar  unmixed, both words and pictures 
produce a general lexical activation that obscure the 
effects f percep ual mismatch. In contrast, when 
lists re mixed, subject attention focus on perceptual 
features of the stimuli to the detriment of lexical 
processi g, sttidy-test perceptual match becomes cri-
tical, and cross-symb l priming suffers a radical re-
duction. 
Brown et al.'s (1991) explanation is related to 
findings showing an interaction between encoding 
operations and the effects of study-test perceptual 
manipulations. Typically, the studies concerned with 
study-test shift on surface form, modality, symbol 
type, or language focused on the properties of the 
st muli and not on what subjects do when encode 
them. R c ntly, however, some studies have shown 
that subjects' perations during encoding have an 
important modulatory effect on study-test manipula-
ti ns. Graf and Rya  (1990) found a reduction on 
priming on word identification as an effect of a font 
manipulation when subjects rated the readability of 
the ords, but not when they rated how much they 
liked them. According these authors, feature proces-
sing during skilled reading is minimal, and hence, 
details about surface features are encoded only 
when subjects focus their attention on them. 
Likewise, Masson and Freedman (1990) prop-
osed tha  surface processing is critical on word 
identification when the reader encounter difficulties 
on the visual analys s of the word--e.g. because of an 
unfamiliar font--but ot when reading is fluent. This 
idea was challenged by Jacoby, Levy and Steinbach 
(1992), who found a decrement of priming on re-
reading as an effect of modality and typography 
shifts in conditions in which reading was fluent and 
meaning based, but not when reading was more 
word-oriented. Whether perceptual specificity effects 
are larger on m aning based or perceptual based en-
co ing task, the foregoing studies underscore the 
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modulatory effects of subjects operations. This idea 
is also supported by Smith (1991), who found interl-
ingual priming for words read or inferred in the 
context of sentences, but not for words read in a 
random list. In sum, recent studies have shown that 
factors that were not considered critical, such as 
whether the study list is mixed or unmixed, can 
have an important effect on priming, and that man-
ipulations that were not usually studied together, 
such as study-test perceptual shifts and orienting 
tasks during encoding, can actually interact. 
New theoretical developments 
The difficulty of standard theoretical accounts 
to explain several puzzling findings have forced 
priming researchers to consider alternative theore-
tical accounts. One of this new approaches can be 
described as adopting of the transfer-appropriate 
processing principle without assuming the data-
driven/conceptually-driven distinction. As reviewed 
before, Tenpenny and Shoben (1992) found dissocia-
tions between two data-driven tests, and between 
two conceptually-driven tests. Both dissociations fol-
lowed the transfer-appropriate processing principle, 
but no.t the data-driven/conceptually-driven distinc-
tion. On the basis of these results, they "advocate 
formulating explanations at the level of the proces-
ses themselves rather than at the level of types of 
processes (i.e., conceptually-driven vs. data-driven)". 
For example, Blaxton (1989) found that the visual 
WFC and graphemic cued recall tests are better af-
ter visual than auditory study, and interpreted this 
results as evidence that both tests depends on data-
driven processing. According Tenpenny and Shoben 
(1992), these results can be explained by assuming 
that WFC and graphemic cued recall tests have a 
process in common that is sensitive to modality of 
presentation. Likewise, McAndrews and Moscovitch 
(1992) supported a "general framework of transfer 
of component processes" ( p.786) focused on "iden-
tifying task components more precisely" (p.786). 
A second kind of theoretical account involves 
the postulation of multiple or complex representa-
tions. As reviewed before, Hirshman et al. (1990) 
proposed that generation priming effects on WFC 
are based on a conceptual representation, and that 
this conceptual representation is not the same con-
ceptual representation that supports generation 
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effects  free recall. The assumption of multiple 
conceptual repres ntations can explain different 
form priming that does not correlate with explicit 
performance. Typically, findings of no statistical 
association between priming and explicit perform-
ance has been interpreted as supporting a multiple 
memory systems view. Hirshman et al. (1990), in 
contrast, pos ulate multiple conceptual representa-
tions without assuming that they are stored on diffe-
rent memory systems. Another recent theoretical 
ccount in erms of complex representations was 
advanced by Jacoby et al. (1992). They postulated 
that data-driven and conceptually-driven processing 
ar  in egrated in an episodic representation. "The 
ep sodic representation contains both perceptual and 
conceptual information, and these are integrated into 
a processing "packag ". The proposals Hirshman et 
al. (1990) and Jacoby et al. (1992) promise new 
ways of conceptualizing the memory representations 
involved in priming. 
Finally, there has been in recent years a prog-
ressive approxima ion of different competing theore-
tical acc unts f priming. Representatives of the PRS 
view have suggested, for example, that "The systems 
approach combined with appropriate processing 
theories s ems to provide the most direct route to 
the future" (Tulving & Schacter, 1990, p.305). 
Theorists of the data-driven/conceptually-driven 
v ew, in contrast, does not seem to agree with such 
integration: "Some r pprochement between the 'sys-
tems' view and ransfer appropriate processing ideas 
may be advisable (Hayman & Tulving, 1989b), but 
for now we prefer to pursue the processing 
approach to see how far it will take us" (Roediger et 
al., 1989, p.79). However, some representatives of 
the d ta-driven/conceptually-driven view are intro-
ducing modifications in the basic assumptions of this 
view that could lead in the future to a constitution 
of a new hybrid view. For example, the incorpora-
tion of th  lexical factor within the data-driven/ of 
conceptually-driven distinction proposed by Weldon 
(1990) might eventually involve the introduction of 
some kind of activa ion mechanism. 
In sum, findings inconsistent with the standard 
data have stimulated new theoretical developments. 
On  of them has been he postulation of a transfer-
appropriate processing view not based on type of 
processes (data-drive vs. conceptually-driven; in-
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tegration vs. elaboration) but on the processes them-
selves. This view advocate for a detailed analysis of 
the component processes of encoding and retrieval 
conditions, rather than relying on generalizations ab-
out type of manipulations and type of tests. Another 
kind of theoretical account involve the postulation of 
multiple representations, or representations that in-
tegrate different forms of processing. Finally, there 
has been modifications on the standard theories that 
might eventually originate hybrid theories. At the 
present, however, most of these new theoretical con-
structions are still on their foundations. 
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